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A PEACE TREATY FOR THE BAR WARS: AN UPDATED
FRAMEWORK TO DETERMINE PERMISSIBILITY OF
MANDATORY BAR ASSOCIATION ACTIVITY†
ABSTRACT
First Amendment challenges against the constitutionality of mandatory bar
associations have frequented federal appellate courts. However, only two
Supreme Court cases are directly applicable to these claims, neither of which
provides a clear framework to adjudicate all of the issues involved. As a result,
appellate courts have taken divergent routes to determine the constitutionality
of whether (1) mandatory membership to the bar generally violates the freedom
of association, and (2) certain activities undertaken by mandatory bar
associations violate the freedom of speech and, in some circuit courts,
association. The first issue has resulted in a rift between circuits. The Sixth and
Seventh Circuits assert that, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, mandating
attorneys to join a bar association does not violate the First Amendment freedom
of association; the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits disagree. As for the second
issue, lower courts are left only with the Supreme Court’s vague description of
what mandatory bar association activity is permissible.
The first issue’s circuit split has resulted in remarkable inconsistency among
the states, thirty-one of which (and the District of Columbia) have mandatory—
also known as integrated—bars. This Comment argues that the Sixth and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, in Taylor v. Buchanan and Jarchow v. State
Bar of Wisconsin, respectively, properly applied Supreme Court doctrine to the
freedom of association issue, thus closing the door on such claims. As long as
Supreme Court precedent remains binding, appellate courts are compelled to
follow it. However, should the issue be determined in favor of the Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits, this Comment argues that freedom of association claims,
along with freedom of speech claims, should be analyzed using a new proposed
“germaneness” test.
This Comment introduces a multifactored sliding scale test to determine
whether activities undertaken by integrated bar associations are sufficiently
germane such that they do not violate the freedom of speech and, should the
Sixth and Seventh Circuit approach be rejected by the Supreme Court,
association. The test blends the approaches of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits to
provide a comprehensive framework to determine the permissibility of bar
†
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association activity. Under this test, the challenged activity must satisfy a weak
connection to pass the basic threshold—the standard for germaneness set forth
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in South Dakota v. Dole. It then considers the
strength of the connection between the activity and the stated goals of the bar
association; the nature and public outreach of the activity; the societal
dissonance of the challenged expression; and the bar’s level of funding toward
the activity. This test synthesizes Supreme Court precedent and current appellate
understanding of the germaneness test, creating an easily applied framework
from existing caselaw.
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INTRODUCTION
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia mandate attorneys to join the
state bar association as a condition of practicing law.1 Mandatory membership
comes with benefits, such as increased capacity to improve access to legal
services and the enforcement of disciplinary measures against unethical
attorneys,2 as well as detriments, namely dues or associated fees. 3 These dues
and bar association activities have been the subject of several controversies in
the Supreme Court and appellate courts—challenges asserting violations of both
the freedom of association and the freedom of speech.4 As of September 2022,
there have been two Supreme Court decisions,5 five denials of certiorari,6 and
decisions in each of the Fifth,7 Sixth,8 Seventh,9 Eighth,10 Ninth,11 and Tenth
Circuit12 Courts of Appeals. This complex web of caselaw has aptly been
referred to by one presiding judge as the “bar wars.”13
In 1961, a Wisconsin attorney by the name of Trayton Lathrop challenged
the constitutionality of the Wisconsin State Bar under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, alleging, among others, violations of his freedoms of association
and speech.14 The Court rejected the freedom of association argument but failed
to address the freedom of speech as a majority.15 Nearly thirty years later, in

1

Leslie C. Levin, The End of Mandatory State Bars?, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2020).
See, e.g., TEX. CODE ANN. § 81.012 (West 2021) (describing the purposes of the Texas State Bar
Association, including increasing the quality of legal services available to the public and maintaining the high
ideals of the legal profession).
3
See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 822 (1961) (plurality opinion).
4
See generally id. (challenging the validity of a state Bar on both grounds); Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
496 U.S. 1 (1990) (same); McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229 (5th Cir. 2021) (same), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
1442 (2022); Crowe v. Or. State Bar, 989 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2021) (same), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021).
Although the challenges under Lathrop and Keller asserted violations of both rights, the majority in Lathrop
only addressed the freedom of association, 367 U.S. at 845–48, and the majority in Keller only addressed the
freedom of speech, 496 U.S. at 9, 17.
5
Lathrop, 367 U.S. 820; Keller, 496 U.S. 1.
6
Fleck v. Wetch, 140 S. Ct. 1294 (2020); Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., 140 S. Ct. 1720 (2020); Crowe
v. Or. State Bar, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021); Taylor v. Heath, 142 S. Ct. 1441 (2022); McDonald v. Firth, 142 S. Ct.
1442 (2022).
7
Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 3 F.4th 748 (5th Cir. 2021); Longley, 4 F.4th 229.
8
Taylor v. Buchanan, 4 F.4th 406 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1441 (2022).
9
Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-3444, 2019 WL 8953257 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 1720 (2020).
10
Fleck v. Wetch, 937 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2019).
11
Crowe v. Or. State Bar, 989 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021).
12
Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178 (10th Cir. 2021).
13
This term was coined by the Honorable Don R. Willett in Boudreaux v. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n. 3
F.4th 748, 751 (5th Cir. 2021).
14
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 820, 822–23 (1961) (plurality opinion).
15
Id. at 845–48.
2
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1990, the Court addressed a similar freedom of speech claim.16 The Court
promulgated a standard by which activities of the bar associations are to be
judged by how germane they are to the legal profession and the goals of the
bar.17 When prescribing this test, however, the Court failed to provide more than
two harsh extremes as examples,18 leaving lower courts to decide amongst
themselves what specific activities qualify as “germane.” Although the
examples provided were, by all accounts, simple to follow, the challenges
brought forth by dissenting attorneys are rarely so basic.19
As a result, each appellate court approaches the question of what activities
are germane differently, with some finding that if any element of an activity is
non-germane, all activities within that category are impermissible,20 and others
engaging in a piece-by-piece analysis of each activity of the same color.21 While
these courts have managed to determine germaneness of activities of state bar
associations, there is a ring of inconsistency around the country as
determinations depend upon the state’s regional locality. As courts approach the
question of germaneness differently, there is a stunning lack of predictability for
challenging attorneys and defending bar associations.
This patchwork approach is an inefficient route through which to answer the
question of germaneness. Rather, this Comment introduces an original balancing
test by which to analyze the germaneness of bar association activities in the
freedom of speech arena and, should the Supreme Court reopen the issue, the
freedom of association arena as well.22 In response to the need for consistency
and predictability in adjudicating these challenges, this novel test operates on a
sliding scale based on a series of precedents and policy purposes that determines
16

Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
Id. at 14. Under the standard, if the activity does not qualify as germane, it violates the attorney’s
freedom of speech. Id.
18
Id. at 15–16. The ends of the spectrum were endorsement of a nuclear weapons freeze initiative and
proposal of ethical codes. Id. at 16.
19
See, e.g., McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229, 250–51 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442
(2022). The challenges to the pro bono activities were based upon the choice of which organizations the Texas
State Bar Association supported, requiring the court to parse through each activity and declare one non-germane
due to lobbying for benefits of low-income Texans. Id.
20
See id. at 251 (“To be sure, most of [the Access to Justice Commission’s (AJC)] are . . . directed [at
making legal representation more available to low-income Texans], and to the extent the Bar is supporting AJC
activities limited to helping low-income Texans access legal services, it is germane. But some of AJC’s activities
include lobbying for changes to Texas substantive law designed to benefit low-income Texans. . . . Therefore,
the Bar’s funding of the AJC is non-germane.”); id. at 252 (discussing the Texas Bar Journal’s activity as a
whole).
21
See Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1192–94 (10th Cir. 2021) (discussing
each of the six challenged articles in the Oklahoma State Bar’s published journal to decide the germaneness of
each).
22
See infra Part III.
17
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whether an activity is sufficiently related to the legal profession. Due to the lack
of clarity as to the threshold of the term “germaneness,”23 this test uses Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s definition from a separate legal field as the baseline to
provide a clear standard by which courts may determine the acceptability of bar
association activities.24 When a bar association’s activity fails to meet Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s liberal standard of germaneness set forth in South Dakota v.
Dole, the activity is per se non-germane and the inquiry ceases. Nevertheless,
this light standard on its own is not a strong position for the bar association and
may easily be outweighed by factors cutting against germaneness. To maintain
uniformity, this test is based on both Supreme Court and appellate precedent,
and matches Supreme Court doctrine from other legal fields to promote
definitional continuity.25
This Comment is composed of four parts. Part I introduces the background
and history of bar associations, the first challenges that reached the Supreme
Court, and the recent challenges at the appellate level. Part II explores these
decisions in the context of existing Supreme Court doctrine, arguing that the
Fifth Circuit’s application of caselaw was improper whereas the Seventh
Circuit’s was correct. Part III introduces a four-factored balancing test built from
decisions of the Fifth26 and Tenth Circuits,27 which provides clarity and
consistency in the adjudication of germaneness of bar association activities.
Finally, Part IV applies the new test to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Crowe v.
Oregon State Bar and to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Fleck v. Wetch.
I.

THE BIRTH OF INTEGRATED BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
FRAGMENTATION OF CASELAW

Modern bar associations first appeared in the 1870s for different purposes
than those today; indeed, they were exclusive groups created as a means to
reduce the number of attorneys entering the profession under the guise of
“rais[ing] the status and competence of lawyers.”28 Over time, these bars have
evolved into three separate categories: mandatory, or integrated; voluntary; and

23

See Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
25
See infra Section III.A.
26
McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022).
27
Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178 (10th Cir. 2021).
28
Levin, supra note 1, at 3–4 (“Elite lawyers formed exclusive bar associations such as the American Bar
Association, the American Bar of the City of New York, and the Chicago Bar Association to raise the status and
competence of lawyers.”); accord RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 44 (1989) (“Concern about the
multiplication of lawyers unleashed by this proliferation of undemanding law schools was an important stimulus
for the re-emergence of professional associations.”).
24
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hybrid.29 Mandatory bars suffered legal attacks in the latter half of the twentieth
century,30 but the challenges lost momentum. Nevertheless, in the late 2010s,
attorneys in states with integrated bars again challenged the constitutionality of
the mandatory membership of these bar associations under the First
Amendment, triggering a circuit split.31 This Part proceeds in four sections.
Section A discusses the creation of integrated bar associations and their history.
Section B discusses the challenges in the latter half of the twentieth century and
the Supreme Court’s decisions relating to the issue. Section C discusses the
recent challenges and the circuit split. Finally, Section D discusses the Court’s
reaction to petitions for certiorari.
A. The Creation of Integrated Bar Associations
For the first century of the country’s existence, the few bar associations that
mirrored the modern format were highly exclusive institutions, acting as
gatekeeping entities for the profession.32 These associations frequently exercised
exclusivity in favor of the urban-elite, as well as white, Protestant, and
American-born men.33 In the early twentieth century, proponents of mandatory
bar associations emerged, arguing that such organizations were necessary on two
grounds.34 The first was that the integrated bar benefited lawyers economically,
in that the organization could set fee schedules and restrict membership.35 The
second emphasized the benefits to the public, as mandatory bar associations
provided legal regulation to discipline attorneys and generated a public voice of
those in the legal field.36 These bar associations toe the line of a legislative or
judicial organization, but “[i]n most states . . . legislatures have left oversight of
the mandatory state bars to state supreme courts.”37 The by-product of
29
Longley, 4 F.4th at 252. Hybrid systems mandate membership for some activities and are voluntary for
all others. Id. at 237 n.1 (“California has switched to a hybrid model in which core functions are performed by
a mandatory state bar, while other functions previously performed by its ‘sections’ are now done by a separate
voluntary bar association.” (quoting CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE §§ 6001, 6031.5(a), 6056)).
30
Lathrop v. Donohue 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Although
these were the first legal challenges against bar associations in the Supreme Court, integrated bar associations
have always had critics. Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from
the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 1–2 (1983) (“Since the first call for a unified bar in 1913,
lawyers have ceaselessly debated whether they should be compelled to belong to an official statewide bar
organization, how such organizations should be governed, and what their activities should be.”).
31
Compare Longley, 4 F.4th at 244 (noting that Keller did not foreclose the freedom of association claim),
with Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19–3444, 2019 WL 8953257, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019) (summarily
affirming the lower court’s determination that Keller foreclosed the claim), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1720 (2020).
32
Levin, supra note 1, at 3–4.
33
ABEL, supra note 28, at 45, 85.
34
Levin, supra note 1, at 4–5.
35
Id. at 4.
36
Id. at 4–5.
37
Id. at 5.
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mandatory membership is the required payment of dues or associated fees by the
constituent attorneys38—a matter of contention among lawyers in mandatory bar
associations.39
Upon establishing integrated bars, the governing body typically provides a
series of goals for the organization, which often resembles the goals of the bar
associations of other states.40 For instance, at its conception, the Wisconsin State
Bar Association was established for purposes including, but not limited to,
aiding courts in the administration of justice; maintaining the high ideals of
“integrity, learning, competence, and public service” in the legal field; and
providing a means for attorneys to discuss issues which pertain to the practice
of law—all of which facilitate the practice of law in the state of Wisconsin. 41
These purposes mirror those set forth in the statute forming the Texas State Bar
Association, which established goals of facilitating administration of justice,
providing a means by which to discuss issues pertaining to the legal field, and
fostering high ideals for those engaged in the practice of law, among other
purposes.42 Throughout the country, mandatory bar associations reflect these
ideals of creating a more perfect legal practice by assisting in adjudication,
providing additional access to pro bono activities, and creating disciplinary
measures for lawyers practicing in the state.43
Notwithstanding recent challenges, the majority of states have retained the
mandatory nature of their bar associations.44 While commentators have argued
against the effectiveness45 and constitutionality of integrated bar associations,46
only a small minority of state bars have completely altered their formats. 47
Despite the flexibility in bar association composition,48 many state legislatures
38
Id. at 7; see also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 822 (1961) (plurality opinion) (noting that the
plaintiff’s complaint asserted that the bar association had wrongfully extracted fifteen dollars in dues payments).
39
E.g., Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 822.
40
Compare TEX. CODE ANN. § 81.012 (West 2021) (purposes of the Texas State Bar Association), with
In re Integration of the Bar, 93 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Wis. 1958) (laying out the Wisconsin State Supreme Court
rules relating to the purposes of the Wisconsin State Bar Association).
41
In re Integration of the Bar, 93 N.W.2d at 604.
42
TEX. CODE ANN. § 81.012 (West 2021).
43
E.g., id.; see also Levin, supra note 1, at 5–6 (noting that many bar associations claim to assist both
attorneys and the public, handling a series of activities which vary in their specifics from state to state).
44
See McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229, 237 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that thirty-one states and the District
of Columbia have mandatory bar associations), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022); see also infra Part II.
45
Levin, supra note 1, at 5–6.
46
See generally Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (challenging the constitutionality of integrated
bar associations under the First Amendment).
47
Longley, 4 F.4th at 237 n.1 (describing California’s change to the hybrid model) (citing CAL. BUS. &
PRO. CODE §§ 6001, 6031.5(a), 6056).
48
Id. at 252 (“Texas can directly regulate the legal profession and create a voluntary bar association, like
New York’s; or Texas can adopt a hybrid system, like California’s.”).
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and supreme courts have, by creating and upholding integrated bars, determined
that their mandatory nature is both constitutional and in the best interests of their
citizens.49 Such is the majority understanding among the states, but the position
is not without its dissenters.50 These critics have recently become increasingly
vocal and litigious,51 but such dissent may not be enough to topple the reign of
integrated bar associations.
B. The Supreme Court’s Adoption of a Shaky Standard
The recent challenges to the legality of integrated bar associations are not
novel; such claims first reached national recognition when Lathrop v. Donohue
was decided in 1961.52 There, a Wisconsin attorney asserted that the state bar
association’s requirement of dues violated his First Amendment freedoms of
speech and association.53 Twenty-nine years later, the Supreme Court
supplemented Lathrop with Keller v. State Bar of California.54 Now, thirty-two
years after Keller, courts across the country are hearing challenges against their
states’ integrated bars.55 New challenges attempt to litigate the freedom of
association decided in Lathrop56 by interpreting a portion of Keller to have
reopened the issue.57 These lawsuits have created a circuit split as to the viability
of freedom of association claims, all while the doctrine’s germaneness test
remains ambiguous. Section one discusses the Supreme Court’s freedom of
association standard set forth in Lathrop. Section two explores the Supreme
Court’s freedom of speech standard as decided in Keller.

49
See, e.g., In re Integration of the Bar, 93 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Wis. 1958) (“The integration of the Bar is
no more undemocratic than the requirement of learning and good moral character of all who seek the privilege
of practicing law. All members had the same opportunity and have freely chosen a profession subject
traditionally to discipline and control by the courts. . . . The integrated Bar does not destroy either the
independence of the Bar or of the individual lawyers.”); id. at 605 (“These Rules and By-laws constitute a
democratic process . . . by which minorities are protected . . . .”).
50
E.g., Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 822; Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 1 (1990); Longley, 4 F.4th at
241.
51
See, e.g., Longley, 4 F.4th at 237; Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 3 F.4th 748, 751 (5th Cir. 2021);
Crowe v. Or. State Bar, 989 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021); Schell v. Chief
Just. & Justs. of the Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2021).
52
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 822–23 (plurality opinion).
53
Id.
54
See generally Keller, 496 U.S. 1 (deciding the freedom of speech claim left undecided by the Lathrop
Court).
55
E.g., Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-3444, 2019 WL 8953257, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1720 (2020); Fleck v. Wetch, 868 F.3d 652, 653 (8th Cir. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 590
(2018), remanded to 937 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2019).
56
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 848 (agreeing with the concurring Justices that the freedom of association claim
should be denied).
57
See Keller, 496 U.S. at 17 (“This request for relief appears to implicate a much broader freedom of
association claim than was at issue in Lathrop.”).
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1. Lathrop and Compelled Membership
In 1961, the Supreme Court decided Lathrop v. Donohue, determining
whether the state’s mandatory bar association violated the First Amendment on
two distinct grounds: freedom of speech and freedom of association.58 Lathrop,
the challenging attorney, complained that the mandatory nature of the bar
association required payment of dues to practice law in the state.59 He claimed
that he paid under protest, asserting that he was coerced to support the
ideological and political activities of the Wisconsin State Bar in violation of his
rights.60 The Court was fractured in its decision of the matter, with Justice
Brennan penning a four-Justice plurality, three Justices concurring, and two
Justices dissenting.61 The plurality declined to answer the question of “whether
his constitutional rights of free speech are infringed if his dues money is used to
support the political activities of the State Bar,”62 because the Court did not have
the appropriate evidentiary basis to make a determination on the issue.63 In
declining to face this issue, the Court turned to the freedom of association
claim.64
Rooting its decision in policy and precedent, the plurality opinion asserted
that no such freedom of association challenge could stand. 65 It first noted that
the challenger’s “compulsory enrollment imposes the duty only to pay dues,” 66
which amounted to a maximum of twenty dollars.67 Quoting the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s decision, the plurality recognized that “[t]he rules and by-laws
of the State Bar . . . do not compel the plaintiff to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend its meetings or vote in its elections as he chooses.” 68
If this finding was not enough to dispose of the association claim, the plurality
further addressed the political nature of the Wisconsin Bar Association’s actions.
After addressing the five categories in which the Wisconsin State Bar had
58

Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 827 n.4.
Id. at 822.
60
Id.
61
See generally Lathrop, 367 U.S. 820. However, the three concurring Justices all found that the freedom
of association challenge was without merit, thus creating a majority holding that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
had properly dismissed the claim. Id. at 848 (“Since three of our colleagues are of the view that the claim which
we do not decide is properly here and has no merit, and on that ground vote to affirm, the judgment of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is affirmed.”).
62
Id. at 844.
63
Id. at 845–46.
64
This issue was eventually decided in Keller. See generally Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16–
17 (1990).
65
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 847–48.
66
Id. at 827–28.
67
Id. at 828 n.5. Lathrop paid fifteen dollars per year in dues. Id. at 828.
68
Id. (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Wis. 1960), aff’d, 367 U.S. 820 (1961)).
59
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engaged in political activity,69 the plurality considered it clear “that legislative
activity is not the major activity of the State Bar. The activities without apparent
political coloration are many.”70 Justice Brennan further emphasized that the
Supreme Court previously held that association claims in this sphere typically
fail.71 Specifically, he highlighted that in Railway Employees’ Department v.
Hanson, the legality of mandatory unions was at issue, where Court held that
“there [was] no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights
than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a
member of an integrated bar.”72 With these findings, the plurality agreed that the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin could impose the burden of dues to “further the
State’s legitimate interests in raising the quality of professional services,”
despite the association’s limited political activity.73
The concurrences felt that the Court should have gone further.74 Justice
Harlan, joined by Justice Frankfurter, agreed that there was no legitimate claim
to the freedom of association, but felt that the freedom of speech claim ought to
have been rejected as well.75 Justice Harlan quickly disposed of the freedom of
association claim, asserting that there was a “short and simple answer:” Hanson
“[laid] at rest all doubt that a State may Constitutionally condition the right to
practice law upon membership in an integrated bar association.”76 Although he
found no distinction between the freedoms of speech and association, he
considered them separately to mirror the plurality opinion.77
In addressing the freedom of speech claim, Justice Harlan focused on each
of the Bar Association’s activities that Lathrop asserted to be politically

69
Id. at 835–39. The five activities were: (1) registration of the bar association’s executive director as a
lobbyist; (2) expression of the State Bar’s formal positions on a variety of issues, including, but not limited to,
revision of federal tax lien law, security transfers by fiduciaries, amending current federal legislation, adjustment
of the salaries of state supreme court justices, and extension of personal jurisdiction over non-residents; (3) the
study and crafting of legislation by state bar association committees; (4) the formation of special subcommittees
relating to legislation, some of which related to the issues described in activity two, as well as one in favor of
world peace; and (5) the publication of a bulletin to express opinions, such as suggesting changes to both state
and federal laws. Id.
70
Id. at 839.
71
Id. at 843.
72
Id. (quoting Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956)).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 850–51 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should have decided on the freedom of
speech claim as well).
75
See id. at 848–65. Justice Whittaker was the seventh Justice to agree that these claims failed, writing
an opinion stating that the ability to practice law is a special privilege and as such, conditions attached to the
practice cannot violate the Constitution. Id. at 865 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
76
Id. at 849 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Hanson, 351 U.S. 225).
77
Id. at 850.
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charged.78 He first attacked the argument that it reduced individuals’ economic
capacity to engage in their freedom of speech by showing that such a proposition
“would make every governmental exaction the material of a ‘free speech’ issue,”
including income tax.79 Harlan then responded to the allegations that the Bar
Association established governmental political views by considering it “hardly
worthy of more serious consideration”80 and emphasizing that the limited
political function of the Bar Association could not be characterized as
governmental support of specific political viewpoints.81 After disposing of the
assertion that mandatory bars created a “guild system,”82 Harlan addressed the
argument that the Bar Association was “Drowning Out the Voice of Dissent.”83
He claimed that the argument that the government cannot use someone’s
mandatory dues to support views with which they disagree had “little force.” 84
Indeed, he highlighted that “[t]he dissenter is not being made to contribute funds
to the furtherance of views he opposes but is rather being made to contribute
funds to a group expenditure about which he will have something to say.”85
Moreover, he asserted that while “it is disagreeable to see a group, to which one
has been required to contribute, decide to spend its money for purposes the
contributor opposes, . . . the Constitution does not protect against the mere play
of emotions.”86 Such a claim failed in other spheres as well; for instance, those
who pay taxes may not be refunded when the government expresses its views. 87
Finally, Justice Harlan addressed the argument that mandatory dues
payments compel the affirmation of the organization’s beliefs.88 This
argument—that the government is compelling members of the Bar Association
to fund (and, in doing so, affirm) the beliefs set forth by the Association—is
inherent in freedom of association and speech claims. Justice Harlan attacked
this argument with vigor, stating:
What seems to me obvious is the large difference in degree between,
on the one hand, being compelled to raise one’s hand and recite a belief
as one’s own, and, on the other, being compelled to contribute dues to

78

Id. at 852–61.
Id. at 852.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 853 (“[I]t seems to me fanciful in the extreme to find in the limited functions of the Wisconsin
State Bar those risks of governmental self-perpetuation that might justify the recognition of a Constitutional
protection against the ‘establishment’ of political beliefs.”).
82
Id. at 853–55 (asserting that no activity is of the type that was struck down in prior anti-guild cases).
83
Id. at 855 (internal quotations omitted).
84
Id. at 856.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 857.
87
Id.
88
Id.
79
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a bar association fund which is to be used in part to promote the
expression of views in the name of the organization (not in the name
of the dues payor), which views when adopted may turn out to be
contrary to the views of the dues payor.89

He agreed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that reasonable people understand
that those views expressed by the State Bar Association are wholly separate from
those of the individuals.90 He extended his reasoning to taxpayers in the
classroom who cannot object to paying for textbooks or instructions with which
they disagree.91 In the end, Justice Harlan considered this particular issue to fall
more within the association realm, which he asserted was closed with the
decision in Hanson.92 Such arguments remain relevant in today’s challenges to
integrated bar associations.93
2. Keller, Compelled Speech, and Borrowing Union Law Precedent
The Supreme Court addressed the freedom of speech issue twenty-nine years
later in Keller v. State Bar of California.94 Keller was the inverse of Lathrop:
the Court adjudicated the freedom of speech claim for the first time,95 but
declined to handle the freedom of association claim.96 Unlike the complicated
series of opinions in Lathrop,97 Keller was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist
on behalf of a unanimous Court.98 There, a group of California attorneys
challenged the mandatory nature of their membership dues, alleging that the use
of their dues to finance ideological and political activities with which they
disagreed violated their First Amendment rights of speech and association.99 The
Court handled the freedom of speech claim as a matter of first impression,
introducing a test by which to determine permissibility of bar association
activities.100
89

Id. at 858.
Id. at 859.
91
Id. at 860.
92
Id. at 860–61.
93
See, e.g., McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2021) (implying that the expressions of
the bar association are understood to be expressions of the members), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022).
94
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1990).
95
Id. at 9.
96
Id. at 17. Dicta at the end of the opinion, suggesting that the associational claim is separate from that
addressed in Lathrop, has sparked many of the recent challenges. See Longley, 4 F.4th at 244 (asserting that
Keller reopened the freedom of association question).
97
See generally Lathrop, 367 U.S. 820 (featuring a four-Justice plurality, two concurrences, and a
dissent).
98
Keller, 496 U.S. at 4.
99
Id. at 4, 6.
100
Id. at 15–17; see Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 845 (plurality opinion) (electing not to issue a decision on the
freedom of speech).
90
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Discussing the integrated bar association in the context of similarly situated
union cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that “[i]t is entirely appropriate that
all of the lawyers who derive benefit from the unique status of being among
those admitted to practice before the courts should be called upon to pay a fair
share of the cost of the professional involvement in this effort.”101 He similarly
differentiated the State Bar from a traditional government agency.102 Rather,
Rehnquist found that labor unions were similar enough to bar associations to
serve as a guide for how to handle such issues.103 Consequently, the Court
borrowed from union law, holding that “[t]he State Bar may therefore
constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the mandatory dues
of all members,” while barring funding of those “activities of an ideological
nature which fall outside of those areas of activity.”104
In differentiating between activities which are sufficiently germane to be
funded by mandatory dues and those which are not, Chief Justice Rehnquist
failed to provide more than a vague standard.105 The Court highlighted that the
determination depended upon whether the challenged activities were sufficiently
related to the legitimate state interests furthered by the bar association—namely
regulation of the legal profession and improvement of the quality of legal
services in the state.106 However, the Court only provided outer boundaries,
claiming that “[c]ompulsory dues may not be expended to endorse or advance a
gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative,” while permitting dues to be
used for “activities connected with disciplining members of the Bar or proposing
ethical codes for the profession.”107 Rehnquist emphasized that these were the
extremes of the germaneness standard but produced no additional criteria or
clarity for determining whether an activity is germane to the advancement of the
legal profession.108

101

Keller, 496 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 13.
103
Id. In the controlling union law case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court handled a similar
issue with political and ideological activity of a union. 431 U.S. 209, 209 (1977). The Court held that those funds
could be repaid to those who objected to the ideas expressed by the organization. See id. at 235–36 (stating that
the non-germane expenditures must be financed from those who did not object to the purposes for which the
money was to be used).
104
Keller, 496 U.S. at 14. The idea that an activity must be germane to the bar association’s goals was
borrowed from Abood. See id. at 13.
105
See id. at 14–16.
106
Id. (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality opinion)).
107
Id. at 16.
108
Id. at 15. If an activity was found to be non-germane, then the activity was still permissible under Keller
if the bar association provided sufficient procedural safeguards by which dissenting attorneys could receive
refunds or rebates. Id. at 17. Since this element of the Keller decision and the bar association jurisprudence is
not at issue in this Comment, it does not receive elaborate discussion.
102
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Finally, at the end of its decision, the Court observed in dicta that the
freedom of association claim was broader than that determined in Lathrop, but
that it would not handle the issue.109 Specifically, the complaint “requested an
injunction prohibiting the State Bar from using its name to advance political and
ideological causes or beliefs,” which the Court said “appear[ed] to implicate a
much broader freedom of association claim than was at issue in Lathrop.”110 The
challenger asserted “that they cannot be compelled to associate with an
organization that engages in political or ideological activities beyond those for
which mandatory financial support is justified under the principles of”
controlling Supreme Court doctrine.111 In declining to rule on this matter, the
Court welcomed state courts to speculate on the issue.112 The ambiguity in the
germaneness requirement and the possibility of the reopening of freedom of
association claims has produced widespread confusion, leading to considerable
dissonance among circuit courts.
Throughout Keller, the Supreme Court relied upon Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, a union law case, to regulate bar associations’ activities. 113 In
Abood, the Court handled a challenge against an “agency shop” provision in the
union’s collective bargaining agreement, which mandated that teachers who
chose not to join the union pay a fee equal in value to membership dues. 114 The
provision, however, did not require that these non-member teachers join the
union.115 In determining the First Amendment question, the Abood Court found
that while the Constitution did not prohibit the union from engaging in nongermane political speech, it was required to finance such expenditures “from
charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing
those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will.” 116 The
Court, as it later would in Keller, failed to define the germaneness standard in
Abood.117
In 2018, in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, Council 31, the Supreme Court again addressed the concept of
agency-fee provisions.118 There, the Court overruled Abood, finding that these

109

Id.
Id.
111
Id. As noted in the discussion of Lathrop, there, the Court wrote that the political activities of the State
Bar Association were clearly not the dominant activity of the organization. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 839.
112
Keller, 496 U.S. at 17.
113
See id. at 13, 16–17. Keller borrowed the idea of a germaneness standard from Abood. Id. at 9, 13–14.
114
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211–12 (1977).
115
Id. at 212.
116
Id. at 236.
117
Id. (“We have no occasion in this case, however, to try to define such a dividing line.”).
118
See Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018)
110
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provisions violated the First Amendment.119 The Court considered the
germaneness standard unworkable as provided in Abood120 and held that, if the
association’s fee requirement fails to pass exacting scrutiny, 121 then the nonmember must affirmatively waive their First Amendment rights.122 Janus
sparked a series of new challenges to the constitutionality of bar associations
with attorneys asserting that, by overruling Abood—upon which Keller relied—
the Court had rendered Keller inapplicable.123 While this view of Janus has not
been adopted by the majority of the Court,124 it has resulted in confusion at the
appellate level which requires clarification.
C. Splitting Hairs on the Keller Decision
Nearly thirty years after Keller settled the general freedom of speech
question as it relates to mandatory bar associations, challengers returned to
appellate courts claiming that Keller reopened the freedom of association claim
originally considered in Lathrop.125 Due to the vagueness of the dicta in Keller,
appellate courts have reached strikingly different decisions regarding the
freedom of association claim.126 The final paragraph in Keller has fractured the
reliability of judicial decision-making in this area of the law, resulting in a rift
between circuit courts.127 This section will discuss this split by introducing, in
(holding that forcing public employees to subsidize a union that they choose not to join violates their freedom
of speech).
119
Id. at 2486.
120
Id. at 2481 (“Abood’s line between chargeable and nonchargeable union expenditures has proved to be
impossible to draw with precision.”).
121
Exacting scrutiny falls between rational basis and strict scrutiny. See id. at 2465 (rejecting the dissent’s
suggestion to apply rational basis review but refusing to rise to a heightened strict scrutiny standard).
122
Id. at 2486. If the non-member waives their First Amendment rights, then their dues may be used to
pay for any activity, germane or non-germane. See id. (requiring a waiver of rights to make non-member fees
constitutional, thus allowing the agency to spend those fees on any expressive activity).
123
See, e.g., Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., 140 S. Ct. 1720, 1720 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (noting that, by overturning Abood, the Court has cast doubt on Keller); Taylor v. Buchanan,
4 F.4th 406, 408 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Taylor argues that Lathrop and Keller no longer bind this court because of
intervening precedent in the form of Janus . . . .”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1441 (2022).
124
See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has relied on [the Abood] rule when
deciding cases involving compelled speech subsidies outside the labor sphere—cases today’s decision does not
question.” (citing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 9–17 (1990))); Jarchow, 140 S. Ct. at 1720–21 (Thomas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Our decision to overrule Abood casts significant doubt on Keller. . . .
Short of a constitutional amendment, only we can rectify our own erroneous constitutional decisions.”).
125
E.g., Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 3 F.4th 748, 756 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining that one of
attorney’s claims was of a violation of the freedom of association, as reopened by Keller).
126
Compare Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-3444, 2019 WL 8953257, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019)
(holding that Keller and Lathrop remain binding precedent and that, as a result, no freedom of association claim
may stand), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1720 (2020), with Boudreaux, 3 F.4th at 756 (holding that the freedom of
association claim was reopened by Keller and properly asserted in the case at hand).
127
There are technically two splits: one over the legitimacy of the association claim in light of Lathrop
and Keller, and the other relating to reimbursement procedures. This second split is only between courts which

180

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:165

order, the decisions of the Seventh, Sixth, Ninth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts
of Appeals.
In 2019, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
heard a challenge to the Wisconsin State Bar’s constitutionality under the
freedoms of association and speech.128 The challenge primarily relied upon
Janus’s abrogation of Abood, which Jarchow argued undermined both the
reasoning and holding of Keller.129 With both sides agreeing that Keller
remained binding precedent, the district court held that the State Bar could
continue to charge mandatory dues without infringing upon claimant’s First
Amendment rights so long as the Supreme Court maintained that Keller was
binding precedent.130 In so holding, the court did not mention the final paragraph
of Keller that reopened the freedom of association claim; rather, the court held
that the claims were foreclosed by Keller and, for that reason, the challenge
failed.131 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals summarily affirmed
the district court’s decision in a one-paragraph decision, maintaining that Keller
foreclosed the claims made by the attorneys who challenged the Bar
Association’s activities and ability to mandate dues payments. 132
Upon application to the Supreme Court, the petition for certiorari was
denied.133 However, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented from
the denial of certiorari.134 Justice Thomas stated that the Court should revisit the
efficacy of Keller.135 He emphasized that Janus “casts significant doubt on
Keller” and that, absent new reasoning, “there is effectively nothing left to
support Keller.”136 However, he conceded that “[s]hort of a constitutional
amendment, only we can rectify our own erroneous constitutional decisions.”137
This denial of certiorari is one of five deflections by the Supreme Court since

have agreed that the freedom of association claim was reopened by Keller. Compare Boudreaux, 3 F.4th at
75859, with Crowe v. Or. State Bar, 989 F.3d 714, 726 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021).
Nevertheless, the second split is not the subject of this Comment and therefore will not be discussed at length.
128
Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-cv-266-bc, 2019 WL 6728258, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 11, 2019),
aff’d, No. 19-3444, 2019 WL 8953257 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at *2. Although the parties agreed that Keller still bound the court, no mention was made of the
reopening of the freedom of association challenge, a different conclusion from those of the courts on the other
side of the split. See id. at *1.
132
Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-3444, 2019 WL 8953257, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019), aff’g
No. 19-cv-266-bc, 2019 WL 6728258 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 11, 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1720 (2020).
133
Jarchow, 140 S. Ct. at 1720.
134
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 1721.
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these issues have returned to the forefront of First Amendment jurisprudence.138
Justice Thomas’s response (and the collective denials of certiorari) suggests that
the issue will need to be resolved in the coming years.
The Sixth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in Taylor v. Buchanan, where
it decided that, since Lathrop and Keller remained binding precedent, the
freedom of association claim was foreclosed.139 While the challenging attorney
conceded that their claim would fail if Lathrop and Keller remained good law—
especially since the bar association’s activities “[did] not cross the line set in
Keller”—they claimed that Keller need not be followed since Abood was
overruled.140 In joining the Seventh Circuit, the court emphasized two points.
First, Janus made no mention of either Lathrop or Keller and therefore did not
overrule those decisions.141 Second, even those Justices asserting that Keller
needed to be revisited conceded that it remains binding law until expressly
abrogated by the Supreme Court.142 However, the Sixth Circuit was not
unanimous in its opinion. In a concurrence, Judge Thapar asserted that “[t]he
association claim could go forward even if the bar association allowed lawyers
to opt out of funding ideological activity” on the basis that any ideological
activity could make the mandatory membership unconstitutional.143 Such an
association claim seems inconsistent with the remainder of the concurrence,
which contended that Lathrop and Keller remained precedential.144 The basis of
this concurrence stemmed from the final paragraph in Keller,145 which referred
to this issue as “a much broader freedom of association claim than was at issue
in Lathrop.”146
It is here, however, where the disagreement begins. In 2021, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Crowe v. Oregon State Bar, handling freedom
of speech and association challenges to the integrated bar association of
Oregon.147 In response to the argument that Keller reopened association
challenges, the court stated that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had previously handled the issue of the expanded freedom of

138
The other four deflections came in Fleck v. Wetch, Crowe v. Oregon State Bar, McDonald v. Firth, and
Taylor v. Heath. See infra Section I.D.
139
Taylor v. Buchanan, 4 F.4th 406, 407 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1441 (2022).
140
Id. at 408. The test in Keller was borrowed from Abood. See supra Section I.B.2.
141
Id. at 409.
142
Id. (citing Jarchow, 140 S. Ct. at 1721 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
143
Id. at 410 (Thapar, J., concurring).
144
See id.
145
Id.
146
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
147
Crowe v. Or. State Bar, 989 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021).
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association claim described by Keller.148 The Ninth Circuit framed the freedom
of association issue as “whether the First Amendment tolerates mandatory
membership itself—independent of compelled financial support—in an
integrated bar that engages in nongermane political activities.” 149
Notwithstanding that the Lathrop Court acknowledged that the Wisconsin State
Bar engaged in some secondary non-germane activities,150 the Ninth Circuit
found the claim to be viable.151 To reach this conclusion, the court emphasized
two interests which ought to be protected under a freedom from compelled
association.152 “First, it shields individuals from being forced to ‘confess by
word or act their faith’ in a prescriptive orthodoxy or ‘matters of opinion’ they
do not share.”153 Second, since the effectiveness of asserting viewpoints is
improved by group association, freedom from compelled association precludes
officials from deciding what views become orthodox.154 The court remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision.155
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Ninth Circuit in its
understanding of the viability of freedom of association claims in light of the
final paragraph of Keller in Boudreaux v. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n and
McDonald v. Longley.156 First, in Boudreaux, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision that the freedom of association claim was foreclosed by
Lathrop and Keller.157 The court found that, in viewing the allegations most
favorably to the non-moving party, the allegations that the Louisiana State Bar
Association participated in non-germane activity were viable enough to survive
a motion to dismiss.158 Although Boudreaux hinged on the procedural posture
of the case,159 the court noted that it agreed with Boudreaux’s argument that “his
claim presents the (previously) open free association question from Keller,”
which it asserted it closed in McDonald v. Longley.160

148

Id. at 728.
Id. at 729.
150
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 839 (1961) (plurality opinion).
151
Crowe, 989 F.3d at 729.
152
Id.
153
Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
154
Id.
155
Id. The court suggested that the district court must determine whether Janus alters the state of Keller
and whether Keller’s germaneness standard applies to association claims. Id.
156
Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 3 F.4th 748 (5th Cir. 2021); McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229 (5th
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022).
157
Boudreaux, 3 F.4th at 756. The claim had been dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id.
158
Id.
159
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160
Boudreaux, 3 F.4th at 756.
149
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In McDonald v. Longley, the Fifth Circuit dove deeper into the freedom of
association issue. After determining that Lathrop permitted mandatory bar
associations which fund solely germane activities, it opined that “Keller
identified that Lathrop did not decide whether lawyers may be constitutionally
mandated to join a bar association that engages in other, non-germane
activities.”161 To determine whether the requirement to join such a bar
association violates the First Amendment, the court asked (1) whether such a
requirement burdened the challenging member’s rights, and (2) if so, whether it
was regardless justified by a sufficient state interest.162 In response to the first
question, the court claimed that for those organizations involved “in expressive
association, . . . individuals have a[] . . . right to ‘eschew association for
expressive purposes.’”163 Since the “government may not compel ‘individuals
to mouth support for views they find objectionable[,]’ . . . compelling a lawyer
to join a bar association engaged in non-germane activities burdens his or her
First Amendment right to freedom of association.”164 This is mostly because
such a bar association would be, by definition, engaged in expressive activity. 165
In the court’s view, “when a bar association does so, part of its expressive
message is that its members stand behind its expression,” thus compelling
members to support such expression.166
After answering the first question in the affirmative, the court explored
whether any sufficient state interest justified such a burden on the freedom to
associate.167 Following union case law, the Fifth Circuit asserted that freedom
of association cases followed at least exacting scrutiny, under which mandatory
associations may engage in non-germane activity only where there is a
compelling state interest and there exist no means that are less restrictive. 168
Despite its discussion of exacting and strict scrutiny, the court ultimately elected
against deciding which level of judicial review ought to apply in this field of
law.169 The court further found that there are less intrusive ways of achieving the
161
162
163

Longley, 4 F.4th at 244.
Id. at 245.
Id. (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463

(2018)).
164

Id. (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463).
Id.
166
Id. at 245–46 (5th Cir. 2021). This is in contrast to the argument set forth by Justice Harlan in his
concurrence in Lathrop. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 858 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
167
See Longley, 4 F.4th at 246.
168
Id.; Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (“Under ‘exacting’ scrutiny, we noted, a compelled subsidy must ‘serve
a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms.’” (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Intl. Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012))).
169
Longley, 4 F.4th at 246. Since, according to the Fifth Circuit, the activity would fail the lesser of the
scrutiny levels, there was no need to consider strict scrutiny. Id. The court determined that, pursuant to Lathrop,
bar associations engaging in solely germane activities survive the standard. Id.
165
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state interests alleged by the state bar—namely, a hybrid or voluntary bar
association.170 As such, the Fifth Circuit took the strong position that “plaintiffs
are entitled to summary judgment on their freedom-of-association claim if the
Bar is in fact engaged in non-germane activities.”171 The Fifth Circuit’s subtler
holding is that in the event that any of the bar association’s activity is nongermane, mandatory membership is unconstitutional.172 Subsequently, the court
analyzed whether each of the alleged activities were germane to the legal
profession173—a process during which each appellate court must engage in
guesswork due to the ambiguity provided by the Court in Keller.174
The Tenth Circuit later joined the Fifth and Ninth Circuits by handling this
issue on rehearing in August of 2021.175 After determining that Keller remained
binding precedent in establishing a germaneness test regardless of whether that
portion of the opinion was dicta,176 the court addressed the viability of the
freedom of association claim.177 It found that the district court erred in holding
that Lathrop and Keller foreclosed the freedom of association claim: “[n]either
Lathrop nor Keller addressed a broad freedom of association challenge to
mandatory bar membership where at least some of a state bar’s actions might
not be germane to regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of
legal services in the state.”178 The appellate court remanded the case to the
district court to determine if those activities challenged were non-germane and,
in the event they were, to assess whether the challenger may assert a freedom of
association claim on that basis.179 These appellate decisions have resulted in
numerous petitions to the Supreme Court to hear a third case to join Lathrop and
Keller.

170

Id.
Id. at 247.
172
See id. at 249 (“In sum, some of the legislative program is non-germane, so compelling the plaintiffs
to join an association engaging in it violates their freedom of association.”). Contra Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 839 (1961) (plurality opinion) (“The activities without apparent political coloration are many.”). The
statement in Lathrop suggests that some activities are political, and therefore permits some political or
ideological speech in association claims. Id.
173
Longley, 4 F.4th at 247–52.
174
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990).
175
Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of Okla. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1178 (10th Cir. 2021).
176
Id. at 1191 (“Even if Mr. Schell were correct that most of Keller is dicta, we would still be bound to
follow it. ‘[W]e are bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court[’]s[] outright holdings,
particularly when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements. . . .’ That is particularly true when the
‘dicta squarely relates to the holding[] itself, and therefore is assuredly not gratuitous.’” (quoting Bonidy v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2015))).
177
Id. at 1194.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 1194–95.
171
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D. Denials of Certiorari and Unwillingness to Decide
Although the Supreme Court must provide clarity on these issues, all
petitions for certiorari have been unsuccessful thus far. First, in 2018, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fleck v. Wetch.180 The Court vacated the
Eighth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of
Janus.181 After the Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusions as it did before
remand,182 the attorneys again appealed, but the Supreme Court rejected
certiorari.183 Soon thereafter, the challenging attorneys in Jarchow v. State Bar
of Wisconsin challenged the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in favor of the bar
association.184 The Supreme Court again denied certiorari, with Justices Thomas
and Gorsuch dissenting.185 The Court then denied a petition from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Crowe v. Oregon State Bar.186 Finally, the Court
recently denied petitions from the Sixth Circuit’s case, Taylor v. Buchanan,187
and one of the Fifth Circuit cases, McDonald v. Longley.188 The Court’s recent
denials of certiorari magnify the importance of this issue at the appellate level.
As this area of law develops, it is likely that the Supreme Court eventually
accepts certiorari in pursuance of a clearer standard and consistency among the
many disagreeing courts of appeals. Justices have dissented to the denial of
certiorari, which suggests a willingness to hear an integrated bar association
case.189 In anticipation of this development, this Comment explores the greatest
solution to the circuit split and introduces a new test for germaneness to provide
clarity to lower courts in determining whether a bar association has violated
dissenting attorneys’ First Amendment rights.
II. PICKING SIDES
The recent appellate decisions have created a complex web of caselaw,
resulting in limited predictability. Due to the similarity between the claims first
introduced in Lathrop and Keller and those brought today,190 the challenges
180
Fleck v. Wetch, 139 S. Ct. 590 (2018). Fleck was an Eighth Circuit case which discussed the procedural
side of Keller. Fleck v. Wetch, 868 F.3d 652 (8th Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 590 (2018).
181
Fleck, 139 S. Ct. at 590.
182
Fleck v. Wetch, 937 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2019).
183
Fleck v. Wetch, 140 S. Ct. 1294 (2020).
184
Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., 140 S. Ct. 1720 (2020).
185
See id. at 1720–21 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Justices asserted that the
Supreme Court needed to revisit the viability of Keller to clarify the law in light of Janus. Id. at 1721.
186
Crowe v. Or. State Bar, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021).
187
Taylor v. Heath, 142 S. Ct. 1441 (2022).
188
McDonald v. Firth, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022).
189
Jarchow, 140 S. Ct. at 1720–21.
190
Compare McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229, 247–48 (5th Cir. 2021) (describing the plaintiffs’
challenge against lobbying for substantive law), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022), with Lathrop v. Donohue,
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should be analyzed within the Supreme Court’s previous holdings. The divorce
of the freedoms of association and speech is crucial to understanding the current
structure: the violation of one is not a per se violation of the other. This Part
analyzes the circuit split in light of existing Supreme Court doctrine, ultimately
concluding that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the proper
analysis of First Amendment claims against state bar associations. Section A
analyzes the freedom of association claim being litigated in each of the circuits.
Section B discusses the freedom of speech claim. Finally, Section C explores the
implications of adopting the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ approach.
A. Compelling Membership
As long as Supreme Court precedent has not been abrogated, lower federal
courts must strictly adhere to its caselaw.191 Such is the case in freedom of
association claims against state bar associations, regardless of the fact that
appellate courts perceive that Keller reopened the freedom of association
claim.192 The proper application of effective doctrine is to faithfully adhere to
the holdings of Lathrop and Keller, neither of which has been overturned.193
Although some appellate courts have considered the freedom of association
claims while claiming to adhere to Keller,194 such application is only proper if
the analysis strictly follows the Court’s decision. Indeed, after proclaiming that
it would remain faithful to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lathrop and
Keller,195 the Fifth Circuit actively constricted the Court’s holding in Lathrop

367 U.S. 820, 836–37 (1961) (plurality opinion) (mentioning that one of the challenged activities is the formal
positioning of the Wisconsin State Bar as to substantive law).
191
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions,
[lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling
its own decisions.”).
192
E.g., Crowe v. Or. State Bar, 989 F.3d 714, 728 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021);
Longley, 4 F.4th at 244.
193
Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-cv-266-bbc, 2019 WL 6728258, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 11, 2019)
(noting that Keller has yet to be overruled), aff’d No. 19-3444, 2019 WL 8953257 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019);
Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 2021) (highlighting that the Supreme
Court, in Janus, did not mention an impact on the holdings of Lathrop and Keller); see also Janus v. Am. Fed.
of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2498 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the
decision in Janus did not question the holding in Keller); Jarchow, 140 S. Ct. at 1721 (highlighting that the
Court ought to reexamine whether Keller is sound precedent but noting that it remains binding until then).
194
See, e.g., Longley, 4 F.4th at 243 n.14 (“So, despite their ‘increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten
foundations,’ Lathrop and Keller remain binding. . . . With that said, Lathrop’s and Keller’s weakened
foundations counsel against expanding their reach as we consider questions they left open.” (quoting State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (cleaned up))).
195
Id.; Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 3 F.4th 748, 755 (5th Cir. 2021) (“As the parties agree, Lathrop
and Keller remain controlling law. Even so, we recognize their weakened foundations, which counsels against
expanding their application . . . .”).
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by adjudicating on the freedom of association. On the opposite end of the split,
the Seventh Circuit, in summarily affirming the district court’s opinion, properly
analyzed and adhered to the controlling Supreme Court decisions. 196
As discussed at length above, Lathrop found that bar associations which
engage in some political activity do not violate constituent attorneys’ freedom
of association by compelling membership dues.197 The new associational claims
find their roots in the final paragraph of Keller, in which a unanimous Court
claimed that the “request for relief appear[ed] to implicate a much broader
freedom of association claim than was at issue in Lathrop.”198 Plaintiffs and
some appellate courts have used this paragraph of dicta to assert that any
ideological activity which does not directly relate to the activities of the state bar
association qualifies as warranting this separate associational claim. 199 This
analysis misinterprets Lathrop and unnecessarily expands Keller’s non-binding
dicta.200 If the Fifth Circuit’s analysis were proper, courts could severely
constrict the activities of bar associations to the point that they cease to exist.
To properly analyze the freedom of association claim, one must fully
understand the breadth of the claim and holding of Lathrop. The challenging
attorney claimed that the Wisconsin State Bar impermissibly engaged in
ideological action through five activities.201 Despite the extensive legislative
activity undertaken by the Wisconsin State Bar, the plurality stated that “it
seem[ed] plain that legislative activity [was] not the major activity of the State
Bar.”202 The Court further emphasized that “[t]he activities without apparent
political coloration [were] many.”203 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan wrote
that he “[did] not understand why it should become unconstitutional for the State
Bar to use appellant’s dues to fulfill some of the very purposes for which it was
196

Jarchow, 2019 WL 8953257, at *1.
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 848 (1961) (plurality opinion). The concurrences asserted that the
Court should have extended its holding to the freedom of speech, thus creating a majority. Id. at 849 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (citing Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)).
198
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
199
E.g., Boudreaux, 3 F.4th at 756 (“Boudreaux alleged that [the Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA)]
engages in legislative activity that is ‘inherently political and ideological.’ . . . With these allegations, Boudreaux
plausibly pleads that LSBA’s political and ideological activity goes beyond what is constitutionally permissible
under Lathrop—that the activity is not justified by the state’s interest in regulating and improving the legal
profession. That is all that is required to present the free association claim that Keller left unresolved.”).
200
Some courts consider dicta to be nearly as binding as precedent. See Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of
Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1125
(10th Cir. 2015)). Be that as it may, such dicta certainly is not binding enough to overrule currently binding
Supreme Court precedent.
201
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 835–39 (plurality opinion). For a list of the activities, see supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
202
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 839.
203
Id.
197
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established.”204 The Court’s conclusion left little room for confusion in the way
of analyzing whether a state bar association’s legislative activity violated the
freedom of association. Despite the seemingly significant lobbying and
legislative activity of the Wisconsin State Bar, seven Justices found that there
was no issue in “compulsory dues-paying membership.”205
Although the Court displayed high tolerance for legislative and ideological
activity in the realm of the freedom of association, there remain appellate courts
which assert that any legislative or ideological activity that is not directly related
to the regulation of the legal profession falls under the Keller expansion.206 In
response to this interpretation, courts have engaged in the Keller germaneness
test—an activity-by-activity analysis that determines whether each is
sufficiently germane to the legal profession such that it does not violate the
freedom of association of the member attorneys.207 Although the Fifth Circuit
rejected a per se rule that any lobbying is non-germane under association
claims,208 the court still overstepped its legal authority in its application of
Keller. Applying Keller’s dicta as a means to overrule Lathrop, the court claimed
that “advocating changes to a state’s substantive law is non-germane to the
purposes identified in Keller. Such lobbying has nothing to do with regulating
the legal profession or improving the quality of legal services.”209 The court
rationalized this by stating that “those efforts are directed entirely at changing
the law governing cases, disputes, or transactions in which attorneys might be
involved.”210
Notwithstanding that the germaneness test is flawed, the Longley court’s
analysis ignores the language in Lathrop—the freedom of association analysis
should never have reached the activity-by-activity analysis. The Lathrop Court
made clear that even relatively significant legislative activity fails to infringe
upon freedom of association rights.211 That the Keller Court found that certain
activities may infringe upon the freedom of speech is irrelevant to their
permissibility under the freedom of association, and Keller’s dicta does not
overrule Lathrop.212 It would seem impossible that the question set forth in

204

Id. at 850 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
206
E.g., McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229, 249 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022).
207
See id. at 247–52 (analyzing each of the alleged activities under the Keller germaneness standard).
208
See id. at 247.
209
Id. at 247–48.
210
Id. at 248.
211
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 839 (1961) (plurality opinion) (“But it seems plain that legislative
activity is not the major activity of the State Bar. The activities without apparent political coloration are many.”
(emphasis added)).
212
See Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 405 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Supreme Court
205
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Longley is a “much broader freedom of association claim”213 than that disposed
of in Lathrop given that the legislative activity mirrors that which was litigated
in Lathrop itself.214 To make the Fifth Circuit’s opinion even more dubious, the
Texas State Bar Association’s legislative activity was the sole activity which the
court considered to be non-germane.215 That is, the Fifth Circuit only found the
Texas Bar’s activity to be violative of the constituent attorneys’ freedom of
association as to the activity which Lathrop specifically held was non-violative
of the attorneys’ associational rights.216 This simply cannot be reconciled with
the existing Supreme Court doctrine, especially considering that the Supreme
Court affirmatively acknowledged the alleged non-germaneness of the State
Bar’s legislative activity in Lathrop and dismissed it.217
Assuming the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have properly analyzed the freedom
of association issue, then a case-by-case observation of the germaneness of each
of the activities undertaken by the bar association is proper.218 Nevertheless,
such an examination of the activities need not be observed under the freedom of
association, since the inquiry is inappropriate pursuant to binding Supreme
Court precedent.
On the opposite side of the split, the Seventh Circuit strictly adhered to
Supreme Court doctrine. In Jarchow, the plaintiff challenged the Wisconsin
State Bar’s mandatory nature on the grounds that it “engage[d] in advocacy and
other speech on matters of intense public interest and concern,” asserting that
“those requirements compel[led] Plaintiffs’ speech and compel[led] them into

abrogates its cases with a bang, not a whimper . . . .”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1124 (2021).
213
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
214
Compare Longley, 4 F.4th at 248 (“Many of the bills the Bar supported relate to substantive Texas law
and are wholly disconnected from the Texas court system or the law governing lawyers’ activities.”), with
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 836–37, 839, 848 (noting that, despite the fact that the State Bar Association engaged in
numerous legislative activities seeking to influence both state and federal law, “it seem[ed] plain that legislative
activity is not the major activity of the State Bar,” and eventually holding that there was no violation of the
freedom of association).
215
See Longley, 4 F.4th at 247–52. The court also noted that some of the activities of the Bar in favor of
needy communities was non-germane, but those related specifically to the association’s lobbying efforts within
that field. Id. at 251.
216
Compare id. at 249 (“In sum, some of the legislative program is non-germane, so compelling plaintiffs
to join an association engaging in it violates their freedom of association.”), with Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 842–43
(“This examination of the purposes and functions of the State Bar shows its multifaceted character, in fact as
well as in conception. In our view the case presents a claim of impingement upon freedom of association no
different from that which we decided in Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson . . . [where w]e . . . held that [the
union] . . . did not on its face abridge protected rights of association in authorizing union-shop agreements . . .
.”).
217
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 839 (“The activities without apparent political coloration are many.”).
218
See, e.g., Longley, 4 F.4th at 247–52. Such an approach follows Keller and would provide continuity
in this area of caselaw.
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an unwanted expressive association with the State Bar . . . in violation of
Plaintiffs’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.”219 The Federal District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin found that, although the Supreme Court overruled Abood in 2018 in
Janus, “[t]he majority in Janus did not discuss Keller nor respond to the dissent’s
citation of Keller.”220 Because the parties understood that the claims failed under
Keller, which remained binding precedent, the court dismissed the claim.221 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion.222 The court noted
that, “[t]o Taylor’s credit, she acknowledges that Lathrop and Keller are an
insurmountable hurdle if they remain good law.”223 Such a statement
demonstrates the proper approach to the freedom of association question: where
binding Supreme Court doctrine exists, the appellate court lacks the authority to
alter the law.224 The argument in favor of this interpretation is a simple one, and
one which the American judiciary has faithfully followed since its inception. 225
Unlike the striking dissonance regarding the freedom of association, courts have
been more agreeable in handling the freedom of speech issue.
B. Compelling Members to Speak
In contrast to some courts’ decisions on the freedom of association, the
freedom of speech approaches advanced by each appellate court was proper.
Keller was explicit in its holding: “[t]he State Bar may . . . constitutionally fund
activities germane to [regulating the legal profession and improving the quality
219
Complaint at 2, Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., 2019 WL 6728258 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 11, 2019) (No. 19CV-266).
220
Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-cv-266-bc, 2019 WL 6728258, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 11, 2019),
aff’d No. 19-3444, 2019 WL 8953257 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019).
221
Id.
222
Taylor v. Buchanan, 4 F.4th 406, 407 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1441 (2022).
223
Id. at 408.
224
In fact, Lathrop suggests that the participation in non-germane activity provides some beneficial value.
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 844 (1961) (plurality opinion). In response to the plaintiff attorney’s freedom
of speech claim, the plurality quoted the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s language, stating that “[t]he only limitation
upon the state’s power to regulate the privilege of the practice of law is that the regulations adopted do not
impose an unconstitutional burden or deny due process.” Id. (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404,
408 (Wis. 1960), aff’d, 367 U.S. 820 (1961)). The Court further quoted the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rejection
of the challenge, which stated that “[t]he general public and the legislature are entitled to know how the
profession as a whole stands on such type of proposed legislation. . . . [I]t promotes the public interest to have
public expression of the views of a majority of the lawyers of the state, with respect to legislation affecting the
administration of justice and the practice of law.” Id. (quoting Lathrop, 102 N.W.2d at 409, 411). Although the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision did not endorse activity wholly unrelated to the legal profession, it
promoted some non-germane political activity which could pertain to the legal profession. See id.
225
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 232–33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981) (“To avoid
an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them . . .
.”).
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of legal services] out of the mandatory dues of all members.”226 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, understanding that “[t]he difficult question, of course, is to define”
those activities which are non-germane,227 set forth the extreme ends of the
germaneness spectrum.228 When it came to compelling speech, the Court held
that mandatory dues may not fund activities including lobbying for issues such
as gun control or a nuclear weapons freeze, but that there is no such infringement
when activities concern disciplinary actions or proposals of ethical codes. 229 In
so defining the standards for “germaneness,” Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to
guide the lower courts any further.230
In the recent surge of challenges against bar associations, appellate courts
have applied the Keller standards to the best of their abilities.231 Nevertheless,
the results of germaneness determinations are scattered. In Schell v. Chief Justice
and Justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the plaintiff attorney challenged
a series of articles in the Oklahoma Bar Journal.232 Handling a limited record,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that without proper discovery, it
could not conclude whether articles relating to those matters which “often break
along political lines” were germane or non-germane.233 The Fifth Circuit
handled a similar claim against the Texas Bar Journal in Longley.234 There, the
attorneys challenged the mandatorily funded journal, which published materials
that were unobjectionably germane to the regulation of the legal profession in
Texas.235 The Fifth Circuit also hinted that a mandatory bar association’s journal
may publish non-germane articles and comply with Keller, so long as it
“includes a disclaimer clarifying that the Bar does not endorse any views
expressed therein.”236 Though the Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals do
not directly contradict one another, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion implies that any
non-germane activity in a bar association’s journal would fail to infringe upon

226

Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
Id. at 14.
228
Id. at 16.
229
Id.
230
See id. at 15–16.
231
See, e.g., McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229, 247–52 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442
(2022); Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1192–95 (10th Cir. 2021).
232
Schell, 11 F.4th at 1193.
233
Id. at 1194.
234
Longley, 4 F.4th at 252.
235
Id. The court listed four activities of the Texas Bar Journal: (1) notices of disciplinary proceedings
against member attorneys; (2) announcements of amendments to rules governing court proceedings; (3)
sanctions released by the committee governing judicial conduct; and (4) articles relating to the legal affairs of
the Bar Association. Id. The court also recognized that where the Journal featured non-germane articles, it did
not maintain a specific viewpoint. Id.
236
Id.
227
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the rights of the attorneys if it included a disclaimer.237 Meanwhile, the Tenth
Circuit recognized that some of these articles may implicate the rights of
attorneys and made no such finding regarding a disclaimer.238
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that “lobbying for changes to [state]
substantive law” in any capacity, regardless of whether such changes are made
for a germane purpose, violates those standards set forth in Keller.239 Despite the
fact that the substantive law for which the Bar Association lobbied debatably
was to “improv[e] the quality of legal services” to low-income residents,240 the
Fifth Circuit interpreted the activity to fall on the “activities of an ideological
nature”241 side of the line.242 This interpretation, albeit strained, does not
technically violate the holding in Keller.243 Nothing in Keller states that lobbying
for substantive law is per se non-germane, but nothing implies that such a per se
rule is inappropriate.244 Rather, under the current framework, so long as the
reviewing court considers the activity to be of an ideological basis, the activity
may be non-germane if it does not “regulat[e] the legal profession.”245 Such a
standard—which is highly deferential to the lower court and even more
dependent upon, at times, limited discovery records—is impossible to apply in
a reliable manner.246 As appellate courts consider the germaneness of state bar
association activities, a test which some courts have applied to both the
associational and speech claims,247 predictability and reliability are paramount
to effectively adjudicating First Amendment claims.
C. Effects of Adopting the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Approach
As evidenced, the current status of the freedoms of association and speech
as they relate to mandatory bar associations is nebulous.248 The Sixth and
237
See id. (noting that a disclaimer is sufficient under Keller’s standards). The Fifth Circuit did not discuss
whether such a disclaimer is always conclusive of the matter. See id.
238
See Schell, 11 F.4th at 1194.
239
Longley, 4 F.4th at 251. The activity at issue related to making representation more available to lowincome Texas residents. Id.
240
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990).
241
Id. at 14.
242
Longley, 4 F.4th at 251.
243
See Keller, 496 U.S. at 16.
244
See id.
245
Id. at 13.
246
See, e.g., Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1194 (10th Cir. 2021) (remanding
for discovery purposes to allow the lower court to make a proper determination as to germaneness of two articles
published by the bar association).
247
See, e.g., McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229, 247–52 (5th Cir. 2021) (determining whether the Bar
Association’s activities were sufficiently germane as to avoid infringing upon the freedom of association rights
of the constituent attorneys), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022).
248
E.g., Keller, 496 U.S. at 13–14.

2022]

PEACE TREATY FOR THE BAR WARS

193

Seventh Circuits’ interpretations simplify the current jurisprudence in this area
of the law. The adoption of this approach would officially foreclose freedom of
association claims,249 producing predictability and promoting fair justiciability.
As it currently stands, whether an attorney may bring an association claim
depends upon the attorney’s home state, since different appellate courts have
interpreted and applied Lathrop and Keller in dissonant manners.250 Such lack
of continuity around the country is avoidable with the adoption of a governing
standard which complies with current caselaw. Moreover, adopting the Sixth
and Seventh Circuit standards would not alter any past Supreme Court decisions.
Rather, it would promote Lathrop and recognize the final paragraph of Keller as
failing to reopen the association claim. Utilizing the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
as a guiding standard can also provide the field of bar associations with its own
settled field of law. Divorcing the union and bar association contexts is
appropriate given the fundamental differences between the types of
organizations, and the provision of a standard more firmly affixed to the context
of bar associations is proper.
Further, this standard would not change the current freedom of speech
jurisprudence, which complies with Keller’s precedential standing. The
germaneness test251 would remain the standard by which courts determine the
permissibility of bar association activity. This allows courts to maintain a similar
analysis to that which they have engaged in for the past thirty years. The
following Part sets forth a modified germaneness test which provides a guiding
standard to clarify the ideas set forth in Keller and the recent appellate court
decisions. This is designed to enhance workability and predictability to courts in
the same sense that adopting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the caselaw
does.
III. CLARIFYING THE GERMANENESS STANDARD
As Section II.B discussed, the standard set forth in Keller consists of two
extremes with no underlying test by which to gauge the germaneness of the
activities of integrated state bar associations.252 Lower courts need a clarifying
standard that promotes equal justiciability, clarity, and predictability across

249
Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-3444, 2019 WL 8953257, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019) (holding
that Janus did not overrule Keller, thus barring a First Amendment claim against the Wisconsin State Bar), aff’g
No. 19-cv-266-bbc, 2019 WL 6728258 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 11, 2019).
250
Compare Longley, 4 F.4th at 244–46 (finding that bar associations can violate the freedom of
association), with Taylor v. Buchanan, 4 F.4th 406, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that the freedom of
association claim failed), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1441 (2022).
251
See infra Part III.
252
Keller, 496 U.S. at 16.
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jurisdictions. This Part introduces a new framework built from opinions by the
Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals by which to engage in the freedom of
speech germaneness analysis and, should the Supreme Court find that the
freedom of association claims are beyond the scope of that decided in Lathrop,
freedom of association analysis. This test will introduce four factors that courts
can use to analyze activities of bar associations in determining whether there is
an infringement upon individual liberties. First, Section A describes the
understanding of “germane” in other legal fields. Then, Section B introduces the
threshold of the balancing test. Finally, Section C explores each of the suggested
factors.
A. Understanding Germaneness
The first step in clarifying the germaneness standard set forth in Keller
requires, of course, an understanding of the dispositive term. “Germane” is
hardly a term of art, but it is defined in the legal sphere as “relevant;
pertinent.”253 Such a definition, while marginally guiding, provides no
additional clarity to the germaneness standard at hand. Typically, the Supreme
Court has no difficulty introducing alternative terms when drawing a distinction
between two concepts,254 so other uses of “germane” by the Supreme Court can
guide its definition in this context. Since this field of First Amendment
jurisprudence is not the Supreme Court’s first use of “germaneness,” prior uses
can provide a glimpse of the intended meaning of the word when used by the
Justices. This section explores the interpretation of the term “germane” in prior
Supreme Court doctrine.
Up to this point, the Supreme Court has failed to define germaneness for the
lower courts beyond the definition set forth in Keller.255 Although the term was
borrowed from former union cases,256 those opinions routinely failed to address
the term more than halfheartedly.257 However, the Court has defined the term in
Germane, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See, e.g., Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (“[The current levels of judicial scrutiny]
rang[e] from minimum rationality through intermediate and up to strict, varying in accord with the degree of
supposed ‘suspectness’ or ‘invidiousness’ of the criterion of classification employed and in response to the level
of ‘importance’ or ‘fundamentality’ of the right or interest distributed or affected.”); Janus v. Am. Fed. of State,
Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2477 (2018) (applying “exacting scrutiny”).
255
Keller, 496 U.S. at 15–16.
256
Id. at 9 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977)).
257
See id. at 16 (providing only the extreme ends of the spectrum). Neither Abood, 431 U.S. 209 (1977),
nor Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), defined the term. Rather, Hanson implied
that, so long as the activity “enhance[s] and strengthen[s]” the goal for which the activity is undertaken, it is
germane. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 235. There was no description of what constitutes enhancement or strengthening
of the goal. Id. The term was similarly left undefined by the Supreme Court seven years later, when it stated that
253
254
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one other field in which germaneness is a crucial consideration: tax and spend
clause jurisprudence.258 The Supreme Court has permitted Congress to provide
federal funds to states on the condition that the state implement legislation which
Congress could not constitutionally pass on behalf of the nation,259 premised on
the tax and spend clause of the Constitution.260
In South Dakota v. Dole, a tax and spend clause case, Chief Justice
Rehnquist (who also authored Keller) applied a standard of germaneness.261
Dole expanded Congress’s use of the tax and spend clause to influence statelevel legislation in its interpretation of the germaneness standard. 262 In laying
out the restrictions upon the power to withhold funds, Rehnquist noted that the
Court’s previous “cases ha[d] suggested (without significant elaboration) that
conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”263 This restriction,
which the Chief Justice termed “germaneness,” was not directly challenged by
the state.264 Nevertheless, the Court’s application of the germaneness standard
is suspect, unless germaneness is to be understood as requiring a loose tether
between the state policy and the federal funds which it is threatening to withhold.
In this case, the federal government withheld federal highway funds from
states that did not require the legal drinking age to be twenty-one, citing that “the
lack of uniformity in the States’ drinking ages created ‘an incentive to drink and
drive’ because ‘young persons commut[e] to border States where the drinking
age is lower.’”265 This connection is tenuous. It presumes that the accidents
resulting specifically from different drinking ages among states are sufficiently
related to highway maintenance and safety that withholding the state’s grants for

“the courts below made no attempt to draw the boundary between political expenditures and those germane to
collective bargaining, and it would be inappropriate for this Court to do so in the first instance and upon the
present record.” Bhd. of R.R. & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Emps. v. Allen, 373 U.S.
113, 121 (1963).
258
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
259
E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 211–12 (1987) (holding that “encouragement of state
action” by threatened withholding of federal funds is a constitutional practice). But see Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012) (finding that, although mild encouragement is a permissible means of
influencing state legislation, the federal government may not threaten to withhold such a significant share of
funds that it coerces the state into taking a particular legislative action).
260
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States . . . .”).
261
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208; Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 3 (1990).
262
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09.
263
Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
264
Id. at 208.
265
Id. at 209 (quoting PRESIDENTIAL COMM’ N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 11 (1983)).
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such maintenance is permissible.266 In dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that
such a condition is only proper where there exists more than “an attenuated or
tangential relationship” between the condition and the grant. 267 A comparison
between O’Connor’s argument that the Court’s germaneness standard fails a
reasonable relationship and the standard set forth by the majority of the Court
indicates that the germaneness standard, as understood by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, does not mandate a strong tether. 268 Such an understanding is critical
to the understanding of the test that will follow in Sections B and C.
B. A Basic Threshold to Germaneness
As with any test, a threshold by which to determine whether a bar
association’s activities are germane is necessary. Such a threshold is vital to
implementing a sliding scale test and sasists courts in handling summary
judgment motions. Given that the freedom of speech is among the “fundamental
personal rights and liberties” as guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution, 269 the
proposed test does not terminate the inquiry simply by finding that an activity
satisfies Chief Justice Rehnquist’s germaneness standard.270 That is, if the
challenger successfully proves that the bar association’s activity is not
sufficiently related to any of the goals set forth by the bar association, then the
activity is impermissible.
Nevertheless, the fact that an activity is merely related under the Rehnquist
standard is not sufficient for the bar association to per se succeed on the merits.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation will usually be too weak on
its own, it is not so weak that the activity is necessarily impermissible. In this
sense, satisfying Justice O’Connor’s understanding of germaneness is a stronger
position for the bar association when considered in the totality of the

See id. at 214–15 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 215.
268
See id. at 208–09 (majority opinion).
269
Schneider v. State of N.J., Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
270
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote both Dole and Keller, it would be improper to consider the
two cases as handling stakes of similar enough latitude to engage in an identical inquiry. That is, Dole related to
the conditional grant of funds stemming from a Constitutional grant to Congress to provide for the general
welfare, anchored by the legislative vesting clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8, cl. 1. Consequently, a weak
germaneness standard may be more appropriate as it simply defers legislative power to Congress. On the other
hand, a liberal germaneness standard in the bar association arena could permit the associations to engage in
speech only tangentially related to the purposes for which the bar association was designed. Cf. Dole, 483 U.S.
at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns that with a liberal germaneness standard, the federal
government could trounce the rights of States to effectively exercise their police power). When the right at issue
is of a personal nature and is as fundamental to citizens of the United States as the freedom of speech, a stricter
standard is more appropriate than that which was adopted by Dole. Such is the purpose of the totality of the
circumstances test introduced in this Comment. See infra Section III.C.
266
267
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circumstances; however, it is not necessary for the purposes of the threshold
test.271 Therefore, this Comment adopts Chief Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation
as a threshold test.272 While the threshold inquiry examines germaneness under
the Dole definition, such a liberal standard is not of great concern when it comes
to protecting the rights of the challenging attorneys because a mere finding that
an activity is tethered to a legitimate goal of the bar association is not, on its
own, sufficient to uphold the activity.273 In essence, the test determines not
whether a particular activity is germane, but whether the challenging attorney
can show that an activity is so non-germane that it is constitutionally invalid. If
the standard is met by the bar association and the activity is at least as tethered
as was understood in Dole (a tangential relationship is sufficient), then the rest
of the analysis is appropriate.
C. Weighing Whether an Activity is Germane
This section introduces a test that clarifies the germaneness standard set forth
in Keller. The test weighs four separate factors relating to the bar association’s
challenged activity. As in Dole, the requirement is that after consideration of
each of the four factors, the activity is reasonably related to the stated goals of
the bar association and those goals which were deemed acceptable by the Court
in Keller.274 The test creates a presumption in favor of validity of the action
unless proven otherwise by the challenging attorneys. Section one explores the
first factor, the strength of the connection between the activity and the stated
goals of bar associations, and the validity of that goal. Section two discusses the
second factor, the nature and public outreach of the challenged activity. Section
three analyzes the third factor, the societal dissonance of the issue within the
challenged activity. Finally, Section four explores the fourth factor, the amount
of associational funding devoted to a given activity.
271
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1930 n.94 (1995)
(noting that Justice O’Connor’s reading of germaneness was “a more meaningful . . . requirement” with a
reasonable relationship prong “hav[ing] more bite” than the majority’s test).
272
The proper evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the evidence. See William C. Bowers, Comment,
Does Due Process Require Clear and Convincing Proof Before Life’s Liberties May Be Lost?, 24 EMORY L.J.
105, 112 n.30 (1979) (highlighting that a preponderance of the evidence only requires that a fact is more probable
than not). This evidentiary standard falls within Justice O’Connor’s understanding of a “reasonable
relationship.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 215. That is, her stricter standard dictates no stronger evidentiary standard.
Consequently, a preponderance standard by default also fits within Chief Justice Rehnquist’s looser
interpretation.
273
Such a standard is especially appropriate where the inquiry is merely whether there is any tether at all
to determine whether the challenge approaches its next steps. Dole can be assumed to be the minimum required
tether between an activity and the stated goals of a governmental action for germaneness to apply. As such,
should the activity meet the same level of germaneness as was accepted in Dole, then the inquiry is not complete.
274
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990). The acceptable purposes, as held in Keller, are
“regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.” Id.
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1. Strength of the Tether
The first factor of the balancing test is the most vital—the strength of the
tether between the activity and the stated goals of the bar association, and the
validity of those goals in light of those deemed permissible in Lathrop275 and
Keller.276 The analysis under this factor includes considering whether the
statutory goal to which the activity is ascribed is valid on its face;277 how the
particular activity furthers the legal profession in that state; and how related the
activity is to the bar association’s goals.278 Notwithstanding the discussion above
relating to the minimum requirement of this factor, the strength of the tether is
undoubtedly the most important factor involved in the test, since the factor is
based upon the “germaneness” name. Achieving the minimum standard of
connection between an activity and a stated goal is not a strong position for the
bar association; indeed, such a weak connection may weigh against a finding of
germaneness. The test is, by definition, contingent upon germaneness,279 but the
focus is more on the strength of the connection. That is, the less “attenuated” the
connection between the activity and the goal,280 the more likely the activity will
be considered constitutionally permissible. Consequently, the strength of the
tether factor is, while not dispositive, the most important factor.
2. Nature and Public Outreach of the Challenged Activity
Once the strength of the tether has been evaluated, the second factor analyzes
the specifics of the challenged activity—namely the nature and public outreach
of the activity. The rationale of this factor is twofold: to determine whether the
activity constitutes an official opinion endorsed by the bar association, and
whether such a position is so public as to be reasonably interpreted as an opinion
which member attorneys endorse.281 When a bar association endorses an official

275
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality opinion) (stating that the Wisconsin State Bar
could mandate dues payments “to further the State’s legitimate interests in raising the quality of professional
services”).
276
Keller, 496 U.S. at 13–14 (“Here the compelled association and integrated bar are justified by the
State’s interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.”).
277
The same test applies when analyzing whether a stated goal of the bar association is valid under the
Keller standards as that when determining the prima facie permissibility of the activity in relation to that goal.
278
For instance, if the complaint attacks lobbying or the publication of the journal in general, this inquiry
would determine how much of the activity is related to the goals set forth in Keller. For an example of an activity
with both related and unrelated claims, see infra Section IV.A.
279
Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
280
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 215 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
281
Although not binding, some Justices have made clear that considering the speech of the organization
to be considered as having received endorsement of each of the member attorneys is inherently unreasonable.
See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 858 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“What seems to me obvious is the
large difference in degree between, on the one hand, being compelled to raise one’s hand and recite a belief as
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opinion, it weighs against permissibility of the activity. Although it may be true
that, as Justice Harlan forcefully stated, the views of the organization will not be
considered the views of the constituent attorneys,282 Keller makes clear that there
are violations of the freedom of speech when the activity is non-germane.283 By
virtue of the violation infringing upon the freedom of speech as opposed to
association, it is reasonable to consider the compelled speech or endorsement of
views to be problematic under the test.284 The second element of the rationale
emphasizes that the more public the endorsement, the more likely the public is
to consider the association’s views to be indicative of the views of the members.
The nature of the activity dictates the magnitude of the bar association’s
endorsement, if any, with this inquiry considering both the type and goal of the
activity. Longley provides an example of the distinction between activity type
and goal: “to the extent the Bar is supporting [the Access to Justice
Commission’s (AJC)] activities aimed at helping low-income Texans access
legal services, it is germane. But some of AJC’s activities include lobbying for
changes to Texas substantive law designed to benefit low-income Texans.”285
Since the activities did not directly relate to the regulation of legal profession or
improvement of legal services, the Fifth Circuit found that the promotion of
substantive law was non-germane.286 The goal of the activity, however, should
not be overlooked—it dictates whether the activity is related to the advancement
of legal services or regulation of legal practice. In the above example, the
promotion of substantive law in favor of low-income Texans, despite the fact
that it involved lobbying, should still require an examination of the goal—in this
case, to benefit low-income Texans by making legal assistance more accessible.
The distinction is that the nature of the activity is the specific action taken by the
bar association—lobbying, programs to advance a goal, or journal articles, for
instance—while the goal is the purpose behind the activity.
The nature of the activity also plays a crucial role in determining whether
the activity expressed a view of the bar association. For example, when a state

one’s own, and, on the other, being compelled to contribute dues to a bar association fund which is to be used in
part to promote the expression of views in the name of the organization (not in the name of the dues payor),
which views when adopted may turn out to be contrary to the views of the dues payor. I think this is a situation
where the difference in degree is so great as to amount to a difference in substance.”).
282
Id.
283
Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
284
E.g., McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[P]art of [a bar association’s]
expressive message is that its members stand behind its expression.”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022).
Contra Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 858 (arguing that the expressions of the bar association are not compelled speech
of the attorneys).
285
Longley, 4 F.4th at 251.
286
Id.
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bar association lobbies for legislation or publishes an article, 287 its views are
explicit. When the bar association publishes a series of resources for citizens to
access, it endorses the resources, but a disclaimer may suffice similar to those
available in bar association journals.288 When the bar association engages in a
pro bono activity, however, there is no explicit expression; there may be an
implicit expression that the bar association endorses pro bono activity, but there
is no expressive statement. The more explicit the endorsement, the more strongly
tethered an activity must be to the stated goals of the bar association to be
permissible. This multifactored inquiry allows for a more nuanced analysis of
activities.
The factor’s second element analyzes the public outreach of the activity.
While the public outreach and the nature of the activity operate conjunctively,
they are distinguishable enough that it is appropriate to consider them separately.
In considering public outreach, activities such as a journal article or online
resources endorsing particular websites for use by state residents produce a clear
public expression. Programs are, by their very nature, reliant upon public
outreach. However, drafting new rules of ethics fails to have significant
outreach. The most difficult to determine of the activities undertaken by state
bar associations is lobbying, which will depend upon case-specific facts. While
some lobbying efforts are inherently outward (for example, hosting or endorsing
events promoting particular legislative policies), others (such as directly
communicating with state representatives relating to the bar association’s
preferred legislative agenda) are not necessarily public. The more public an
endorsement of the bar association, the more related the activity must be to the
stated goals of the bar association.
This factor weighs publicity to understand the likelihood that the general
public will consider the bar association’s expressions to be those of the attorney.
This is necessary considering that it is impossible to know whether laypersons
consider the views of the organization to represent the views of the individual
members.289 The mere fact that an activity is public will not necessarily
outweigh the probative value of the germane activity, but this factor serves as a
287
The state bar association’s published journal is not always an explicit endorsement of the views of the
organization—a disclaimer emphasizing that the views endorsed in the journal are not those of the bar
association may be sufficient to avoid ratification issues. Id. at 252 (“[T]he Journal . . . includes a disclaimer
clarifying that the Bar does not endorse any views expressed therein. That structure suffices under Keller.”).
288
See id.
289
In all likelihood, neither extreme is a proper understanding of this issue. It is possible that some people
consider the views of the bar association to be endorsed by member attorneys, especially where the bar
association publishes articles without disclaimers in their journal supporting specific viewpoints. That said, there
is merit to Justice Harlan’s point that there is a divorce between legitimately compelled speech and merely
paying dues to a bar association which actively endorses some viewpoints. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 858.
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counterweight to how germane an activity is—the more germane the activity,
the more the bar association may publicly endorse its stance. The more weakly
tethered, however, the less the bar association may endorse the activity publicly
without stepping upon the rights of its member attorneys.
3. Societal Dissonance of the Issue
The third factor in determining whether a particular bar association activity
infringes upon the First Amendment rights of the members is the societal
dissonance of the issue. The more politically charged an issue is to society, the
stronger the tether must be for the activity to be permissible. There will, of
course, be occasions in which the activity or issue is neither unanimous nor so
politically charged that it is taboo.290 In these situations, this factor becomes less
important but, much like the second factor, it applies on a sliding scale. The
extremes of the scale are near-societal unanimity (anti-terrorism, for instance)
and harsh societal divide (gun control291). The more politically divisive an issue,
the stronger the tether must be to the permissible goals and interests of the bar
association to avoid infringement upon the rights of member attorneys. 292 Take
taxes, which typically divide citizens, as an example: if the connection between
the endorsed expression and the interests of the bar association are weak, the
views expressed by the bar association are more likely to offend individual
attorneys and thus infringe upon their liberties. Nevertheless, some activities are
germane despite dissonance among attorneys if the first factor is strong
enough.293
This factor is borne out of Keller’s determination that “those activities
having political or ideological coloration which are not reasonably related to the
290
Examples of such issues include environmental issues, defense funding, and education. Cf. Important
Issues in the 2020 Election, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/08/
13/important-issues-in-the-2020-election/ (illustrating the issues most important to voters in the 2020 election,
with defense funding and education not being named). Naturally, these issues inspire discourse among citizens
who disagree with one another. These issues, however, fall under the category of issues in which the division is
not as spirited, in which case it is not weighed as harshly against the bar association as if the issue inspired severe
dissonance.
291
Keller itself found that endorsement of such an issue would not fall within the germaneness sphere.
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990). While such an endorsement would never reach this stage in
the analysis because it fails the first prong, this serves as an adequate example of highly spirited societal
dissonance which would weigh against an organization. There are, however, times in which an endorsement may
be germane and still be divided in public (initiatives assisting low-income populations through raised taxes could
be, if tied to the legal profession, germane).
292
There is no particular standard by which courts must determine societal dissonance. Parties may, of
course, bring evidence to prove such divisiveness, but such is not necessary, especially in cases which are
reasonably known to cause such disagreement.
293
See Longley, 4 F.4th at 249–50 (“To take a non-controversial example, the Bar’s advocating a particular
ethical rule is germane no matter how strenuously an attorney might disagree with its propriety.”).
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advancement of [the State Bar’s] goals” are impermissible.294 This implies that
political or ideological affiliation is not dispositive; rather, it depends upon the
level of relatedness to the organization’s legitimate interests.295 The statements
in Keller, which noted the difficulty in deciding what was germane,296 have been
interpreted in a similar manner to this factor in more recent appellate decisions.
In Schell, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the issue of determining
whether two of the six challenged Oklahoma Bar Journal articles were germane
for need of a more advanced discovery record.297 In determining that it could not
make a summary judgment decision based on the current evidentiary record, the
court noted that, with regard to one article, the issues discussed “often break
along political lines.”298 Further, the court noted that “other allegations in Mr.
Schell’s Amended Complaint support the plausibility of this article having an
ideological tinge . . . .”299 However, rather than assuming on these facts that such
ideological or political coloration made the articles per se non-germane, the
court noted that “without viewing the article, it is impossible to conclude the
OBA did not advance a non-germane, ideological position through its April 2017
publication of the Oklahoma Bar Journal.”300 Such an analysis is similar to that
advanced by this factor: while political or ideological coloration may hint that
there is an infringement upon the personal liberties of the member attorneys,
such a conclusion must be proven by the record. The more ideological or
political the expressive activity is, the stronger the connection between the
activity and the organization’s interests must be.
4. Level of Organizational Funding
The final element of the germaneness evaluation is the level of
organizational funding by the bar association toward the activity. This factor is
the least important of the four, and is only influential where the level of funding
is so egregious as to warrant a stronger tether, or where it must operate as a
tiebreaking factor in close cases.301 Nevertheless, this final factor’s application

294

Keller, 496 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
See Longley, 4 F.4th at 247 (noting that not all activities of a political or ideological nature are
automatically non-germane).
296
Keller, 496 U.S. at 15 (noting that determining which issues that are political or ideological are not
sufficiently connected to the State Bar’s goals are “not always . . . easy to discern”).
297
Schell v. Chief Just. & Justs. of Ok. Sup. Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1194–95 (10th Cir. 2021).
298
Id. at 1194.
299
Id.
300
Id.
301
Although this Comment does not explore the Fifth and Ninth Circuit split in great detail, the Fifth
Circuit considers any non-germane activity—even the smallest amount—to mandate implementation of stringent
procedures to reimburse the dissenting attorney. See Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 3 F.4th 748, 759 (5th
Cir. 2021). As such, the germaneness determination may have significant impacts, including potential findings
295
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is straightforward: the more the bar association spends to endorse an activity,
the more strongly tethered the activity must be to be a permissible exercise of
the bar association’s interests. However, as the bar association’s expenditures
decrease, the tether need not be so strong. If expenditures by the bar association
are minimal, the likelihood of a violation of the constituent attorneys’ rights are
similarly low. Further, the level of organizational funding can, in a sense, work
collaboratively with the second factor. The greater the expenditures of the bar
association, the more likely it is that the activity has significant public reach.
Consequently, this factor works as a sliding scale which, as the funding
increases, operates against the bar association.
IV. DISCIMUS AGERE AGENDO302
The multifactored balancing test introduced above combats the problems
established by the vague standard set forth in Keller.303 Namely, the test provides
workability and predictability in determinations of the germaneness of activities
of integrated bar associations. Despite the straightforward application of each of
the factors, it is vital to understand how the factors work collaboratively in
analyzing whether an activity is sufficiently germane. The most effective way
of understanding the test is to apply it to current cases which have not yet
determined the germaneness of the alleged impermissible activities.304 Each of
the cases described in this Part, which is split into two sections, did not address
the germaneness of the activities at issue.305 Section A applies this framework
to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Crowe v. Oregon State Bar. Section B applies
the test to the Eight Circuit’s decision in Fleck v. Wetch.
A. Applying the Framework to Crowe
In Crowe, the Ninth Circuit declined to address whether two articles in the
Oregon State Bar’s publication, the Bulletin, were sufficiently germane to

that the association itself, due to its mandatory nature, is unconstitutional.
302
We Learn to Do by Doing.
303
See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990).
304
Additionally, since the test is borne out of the decisions in Longley and Schell, applying the test to those
cases would provide no additional clarity. This Comment agrees with each of the ultimate germaneness
determinations made in Longley. For discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, see supra Section II.B.
305
Crowe v. Or. State Bar, 989 F.3d 714, 724 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We need not decide whether the district
court erred in concluding that the Bulletin statements are germane under Keller . . . .”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
79 (2021); Fleck v. Wetch, 937 F.3d 1112, 1116–17 (8th Cir. 2019) (“It may well be . . . that Keller and Lathrop
did not consider, and therefore did not foreclose, [Fleck’s] First Amendment associational claim. . . . We decline
to consider these issues because . . . the claim must still be decided on an evidentiary record.”), cert. denied, 140
S. Ct. 1294 (2020).
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survive a freedom of speech claim.306 The challenged articles were published
alongside one another: one was an official statement of the Oregon State Bar
and the other a statement of the voluntary bars.307 Each of the Bulletin articles
denounced the rise of white nationalism in the country and within the state of
Oregon.308 The official Bar Association statement pledged, in light of the climate
of white nationalism, to remain committed to improving access to justice and
“promot[ing] . . . a healthy and functional judicial system that equitably serves
everyone.”309 The voluntary bar associations took a more critical tone of thenPresident Donald Trump, but used the platform to assert that they had “a duty as
attorneys to speak up against injustice, violence, and when state and federal laws
are violated in the name of white supremacy or white nationalism.”310 The
voluntary bars pledged to utilize their resources “to protect the rights and safety
of everyone.”311 In response to the allegation that the Bulletin articles were nongermane, the Bar asserted that each article was germane to improving the quality
of legal services.312 This section discusses each of the articles in turn.
The first of the articles, the Bar’s official statement, passes the threshold for
germaneness.313 The Bar’s dedication to improving access to legal services is
certainly within the goal of endorsing “a healthy and functional judicial system
that equitably serves everyone” and advancing an inclusive legal profession. 314
After crossing the threshold, the article must be evaluated under each of the
factors.
Under the first factor, the strength of the tether, the factfinder must determine
the strength of the connection between the activity and the stated goal, taking
into account the legitimacy of the goal. Improving access to legal services and
endorsing an equitable judicial system are both legitimate objectives of a bar
association.315 This purpose has a strong connection to the Bar Association’s
306
Crowe, 989 F.3d at 724. The issue was not addressed as the freedom of speech claim failed on a separate
technicality. Id. at 727.
307
Id. at 721–22.
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Id. at 723.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
As mentioned above, the threshold is Chief Justice Rehnquist’s liberal interpretation of germane. See
supra Section III.B.
314
Crowe, 989 F.3d at 721–22. Such a dedication similarly relates to improving the quality of legal
services by demonstrating a commitment to the promotion of access to legal services.
315
Lathrop demands that the activities “further the State’s legitimate interests in raising the quality of
professional services . . . .” Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality opinion). Keller dictates
that the activities can be “justified by the State’s interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the
quality of legal services.” Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990). Here, the goals of improving
access to legal services and fostering an equitable judicial system clearly fall within the standards set forth in
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published article. The Bar provided context for the article in the beginning by
discussing the rise of white nationalism in the country and its home state, and
related it to the legal profession in reiterating its commitment to promoting
access to justice—such falls squarely within its statutory goals of “[a]dvancing
a fair, inclusive[,] and accessible justice system.”316 The second factor requires
an analysis of the article’s public outreach. As mentioned above, the publication
of a journal article, especially one which expresses an official view of the Bar
Association, is extremely public.317 Due to the nature of the activity—
publication of the Bar Association’s views—this weighs against
permissibility.318 The third factor, societal dissonance, cuts in favor of
permissibility. This first article engages in no discussion of politics nor of gun
rights in its condemnation of acts of white nationalism and violence,
respectively.319 Such a denunciation should not be considered partisan or
ideological and, therefore, this factor cuts in favor of permissibility. The final
factor, the amount of capital spent on the activity, is not discussed at length in
Crowe, but it appears to be minimal—those attorneys who dissented to the
publication of the two articles received a total refund of $1.15. 320 Despite being
a weak factor, the fourth factor here does not weigh against permissibility. In the
totality of the circumstances, this activity should be considered germane.
The second article is a closer case and leans non-germane. The voluntary
bars’ joint statement successfully passes the threshold test of Rehnquist’s
definition of germane—there is, at the least, a weak connection between the
article’s commitment to “protect[ing] the rights . . . of everyone” and the Oregon
State Bar’s stated goals.321 As to the first factor, the connection satisfies the
baseline as described above. There is also an argument that the commitment,
similar to the case of the first article, is reasonably related to the goals of the Bar
Association with greater than an “attenuated or tangential relationship,” as

each of Lathrop and Keller.
316
Crowe, 989 F.3d at 720 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 9.080), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 79 (2021). Other
goals of the Oregon State Bar include regulation and improvement of the legal profession, providing support to
the judiciary, and “improving the administration of justice.” Id. Note, also, that in finding that it falls squarely
within a legitimate goal, it satisfies Justice O’Connor’s more stringent definition of germane. See supra note 270
and accompanying text.
317
This Comment has noted that a disclaimer that the articles published within a particular bar’s journal
are not the views of that bar association may be sufficient, pursuant to Longley. Such is inapplicable here, where
the Bar Association is publishing its official view.
318
This finding is not, on its own, enough to overpower the finding of germaneness in the first factor.
319
See Crowe, 989 F.3d at 721–22.
320
Id. at 723. For reference, North Dakota’s dues total $380 for attorneys who have practiced for more
than five years, their highest rate. Fleck v. Wetch, 937 F.3d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
1294 (2020).
321
Crowe, 989 F.3d at 723.
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required by Justice O’Connor.322 However, a healthy portion of the article
centers around criticism of then-President Trump’s handling and exacerbation
of racism in America.323 While there is a connection that satisfies the Rehnquist
level of germaneness, such likely fails to meet O’Connor’s standard and, if it
does, it does so barely.324 As such, the article is not on the sturdiest footing. The
second factor, nature and public outreach of the activity, is the same as that in
the first article. By its very nature of being a journal, the activity has a wide
public outreach. Further, the Bulletin is published by the Oregon State Bar, thus
purporting to voice the views of the Bar Association itself. 325 This factor cuts
against the permissibility of the activity.
The third factor tips the scales in this case—societal dissonance of the issue.
While condemnation of white supremacy should not be considered a political or
ideological activity (and, even if it were, that expression is strongly tethered, as
confirmed by the first article), the second article engages in criticism which may
be viewed as having political coloration.326 Although the article quotes thenPresident Trump throughout the critical paragraph to legitimize the criticism and
therefore serve as background information, the article also states that his base of
support is composed of the white nationalist movement.327 Regardless of the
veracity of the claim, the criticism, by the nature of its publication in the Bulletin,
receives the endorsement of the Oregon State Bar, and is sure to create societal
dissonance. As such, the third factor cuts against germaneness. As with the first
article, the fourth factor does not play a major role in this case but does not cut
against permissibility due to the minimal expenditures used to engage in the
activity.328 Taking each of the factors into account, the case is close, but weighs
against permissibility. Although the presumption is in favor of the Bar
Association,329 the article, without a disclaimer, and the political criticism are
sufficient to find that publication of the article violates the challenging attorneys’
right to speech under Keller.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 215 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Crowe, 989 F.3d at 722–23.
324
As noted in Section III.A, Justice O’Connor’s definition requires more than a tangential relationship
between the entire statement and the purported goals of the Bar Association. Here, the generalized criticism of
a political base is likely insufficient to fall within the stated goals of the Bar.
325
There is no evidence that the Bulletin possesses a disclaimer. See Crowe, 989 F.3d at 721–23.
326
See id. at 722–23.
327
Id. at 722 (“Trump, as the leader of our nation, . . . has . . . allow[ed this white nationalist movement]
to make up the base of his support”).
328
See id. at 723.
329
See supra Section III.B.
322
323
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B. Applying the Framework to Fleck
In Fleck v. Wetch, a North Dakota attorney challenged the State Bar
Association of North Dakota’s (SBAND) ability to mandate membership on the
grounds that it violated his First Amendment rights.330 The challenging attorney
ardently supported a state legislative measure, spending personal time and
money to support its passage.331 Fleck later discovered, however, that the State
Bar opposed the measure, spending a total of $46,525.85 in opposition.332 The
measure in question, if passed, would create a presumption that each parent is
fit to maintain custody, resulting in their entitlement to equal parental rights. 333
Although the issue of germaneness was not litigated in this case,334 this section
discusses whether this activity would be considered germane under the proposed
framework if this type of activity were brought to the court.
The first question is whether the activity passes the threshold test. In this
event, it likely does not. The measure addresses substantive law relating to the
fitness of parents, and the lobbying for or against such a law does not facially
relate to the stated goals of the Bar Association.335 Nevertheless, to engage in
the exercise, this section assumes that it can be found that, under the stated goal
of endorsing the fair “administration of justice,”336 the activity passes the
threshold test.337
The threshold test has just demonstrated that the first factor, strength of the
tether, is practically as weak as it can get. While one may argue that the
presumption of custodial fitness may lead to inequity in family court (therefore
hindering the fair administration of justice), the connection is tenuous at best.
The second factor—nature and public outreach—is a difficult factor to
determine when it comes to lobbying. However, in this lobbying effort, the
SBAND permitted the “Keeping Kids First” committee to establish an email

330

See Fleck v. Wetch, 937 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1294 (2020).
Fleck v. Wetch, No. 1:15-CV-13, 2016 WL 9710086, at *2 (D.N.D. Jan. 28, 2016), aff’d, 937 F.3d
1112 (2019).
332
Id.
333
Id.
334
Fleck, 937 F.3d at 1117 (declining to determine germaneness in the first instance on remand).
335
See Fleck, 2016 WL 9710086, at *1 (“The objectives of SBAND are to improve professional
competence, promote the administration of justice, uphold the honor of the profession of law, and encourage
cordial relations among members of the State Bar.”).
336
Id.
337
This section engages in the germaneness analysis of this activity to demonstrate two elements which
were not addressed by the case study in Crowe. First, it discusses the impact of lobbying on the germaneness
test. Second, it showcases an example in which the fourth factor, organizational spending on the issue, becomes
influential.
331
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address on their domain name.338 This is, at the least, semi-outward and cuts
against permissibility due to the nature of a public endorsement through the
email address. Additionally, the amount spent on the lobbying—upwards of
$45,000339—suggests that the Bar Association’s stated position was at least
somewhat public. The third factor, societal dissonance, is of less importance in
this case. While Fleck ardently supported the measure,340 such disagreement
between the challenging attorney and the Bar Association alone does not
establish societal dissonance. While the amount expended by the Bar
Association suggests that it may have been hotly debated,341 it is impossible to
know without a developed record. For the sake of the exercise, this Comment
assumes that there was moderate societal dissonance on the issue. In that event,
the third factor weighs slightly against permissibility. Finally, the fourth factor,
the amount spent on the activity, while usually not a major factor, gains
importance in this scenario when egregious amounts are spent on the activity.
Here, nearly $50,000 was spent in membership dues in opposition of the
legislation.342 This weighs against permissibility unless the activity has a
stronger tether as determined under the first factor. In this case, the tether was
found to be immensely weak. Taking each of these factors into consideration, if
this activity passed the threshold test, the activity would still fail under this
framework as non-germane.
CONCLUSION
When the Court promulgated the germaneness standard in Keller with
limited guidelines,343 it destined lower courts to years of confusion and
inconsistency. In recent years, although the germaneness test itself is a strong
baseline for determining permissibility of integrated bar association actions,
there has been a lack of uniformity in approaches and results in different
appellate courts. In being left to their own devices, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits
each have found ways to determine the germaneness of bar association activities.
Combining these approaches into a comprehensive framework—one that is
reasonably fact-intensive and produces equitable results—is the most effective
way to promote fair administration of justice and uniformity across the country.
The test set forth by this Comment synthesizes elements which rationally
relate to the determination of whether a bar association’s actions could violate
338
339
340
341
342
343

Fleck, 2016 WL 9710086, at *2 (explaining the email address read “keepingkidsfirst@sband.org”).
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1990).
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the First Amendment and addresses the criticism set forth in Janus that “Abood’s
line between chargeable and nonchargeable union expenditures has proved to be
impossible to draw with precision.”344 Namely, it analyzes factors which bring
together both relevant caselaw and the general interpretation of individuals who
are members of these organizations. The balancing of the factors allows for some
leeway in the bar associations’ goals of administering fair justice, promoting
equal access to the law, and regulating and disciplining lawyers while precluding
them from overstepping their boundaries into supporting substantive legislation
with no connection to their stated goals. This test is better shaped to the factintensive inquiries that each of the appellate courts have undertaken while
providing clearer guideposts than those set forth in Keller.345 Finally, this new
framework achieves both the consistency and predictability concerns discussed
throughout this Comment, thus endorsing one objective of many bar
associations—improving the fair administration of justice.
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